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of Recent Legislative Approaches
I. INTRODUCTION
Regulation of land use, traditionally a responsibility of local
government,' increasingly is becoming a state concern. In re-
cent years, there has been a flood of new legislation designed
to permit some agency of state government to participate in
fashioning controls which will govern use of land at the local
level. This note attempts a survey of this legislation.
The note will examine recent legislation in ten selected
topical areas: 2 zoning on a state-wide basis, surface water zon-
ing, zoning of airport areas, power plant siting, regulation of
trailer and mobile home parks, regulation of large scale devel-
opments, regulation of coastal wetlands, regulation of shore-
lands and scenic river areas, regulation of floodplains and regula-
tion of regional development. Within each topical area, the ma-
jor recent legislation will be summarized and briefly evaluated.
There will be no discussion of what form legislation in a particu-
lar area ought to take. Discussion will be confined wholly to an
examination of the relative merits and drawbacks of particular
legislation as compared with statutes existing in other states. It
is hoped that, by analysis of what other states have done, legisla-
tors and those drafting new legislation will be given a sounding
board by which to judge their own efforts. Familiarity with the
statutes of other states should serve both to suggest substantive
ways to improve proposed legislation and to provide some prece-
dent for gauging the political feasibility of that legislation.
The ten topical areas are categorized loosely under one of
the following four section headings: (1) statutes which provide
1. See text accompanying notes 4-7 infra.
2. Of course the topical areas chosen do not begin to cover all
areas of state participation in the land regulation process. However,
they should give the reader some broad understanding of the many,
varying approaches adopted by the states to regulate or guide land use
at the local level. Some of the noteworthy statutes excluded from the
discussion are: the Massachusetts Zoning Appeals Act, MAss. Gzu.
LAws AwN. ch. 40B, §§ 20-23 (Supp. 1971), which attempts to deal with
problems of exclusionary zoning; open space laws (see, e.g., CAL. GOV'T
CODE §§ 6950, 50575 et seq., 51200 (West 1966) ); a wide range of
pollution control statutes which have some impact on land use (see, e.g.,
MNN. STAT. § 115.01 et seq., § 116.01 et seq. (Supp. 1971).
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
for direct state-level regulation of local land use; (2) statutes
which forbid local development except with state approval; (3)
statutes which provide for state guidance of efforts by local
governments to regulate land use; and (4) statutes which es-
tablish some form of regional governmental agency to adminis-
ter a regional system of land use controls. Correlation of topical
areas to section headings, however, is at best imperfect. The
statutes are highly diverse, even when directed at identical
problems. Nevertheless, to the extent that a majority of the
statutes within any topical area can be characterized as within
a given section heading, that topical area will be included under
that heading.
Finally, it should be pointed out that this article is only a
starting point. The material presented may be of help to those
seeking to draft or pass upon new legislation, but it should not
be considered exhaustive. It cannot take account of the peculiar
political, socio-economic or physical problems which a particular
state may face. In addition, it considers only a small portion
of the plans and model statutes recommended by scholars and
commentators.3 With these apologies, however, the note may
be a useful tool to those seeking to evaluate the recent dynamics
in land use control.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Regulation of land use traditionally has been a local func-
tion.4 The local layman considers himself entirely capable of
making decisions on such matters5 and envisions local land use
regulation as a method of preserving property values and main-
taining the "tone" of his community.0 Local governments also
3. See, e.g., D. Heeter, Toward a More Effective Land-Use Guid-
ance System: A Summary and Analysis of Five Major Reports (pub-
lished by the American Society of Planning Officials) (1970); ALI MODEL
LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE (Tent. Drafts Nos. 2 & 3, 1970, 1971).
4. Nearly all 50 states have enacted enabling legislation modeled
closely after the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act (SZEA) prepared
by the United States Department of Commerce in 1922. See ALI
MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1968) at Appendix
A, and (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1970) at xi. Basically, the SZEA authorizes
local governments to divide their territory into zones and to specify the
types of land use permitted in each zone. Since 1926, when local
zoning power was upheld by the United States Supreme Court in the
landmark case of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365
(1926), land use regulation has been left almost entirely in the hands
of local government.
5. See R. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME 19-20 (1966).




are closest to local problems, can make decisions relatively
quickly and are most responsive to the local voter.'
Despite these supposed advantages, the desirability of local
control over all land use decisions is now in serious question."
Each local community, being concerned with its own protection,
has tended to zone its land to avoid becoming a refuse heap for
undesirable uses.9 The result has been urban sprawl,10 exclu-
sionary zoning' and unplanned development. Regional prob-
lems such as pollution, inadequate housing or improper man-
agement of the environment have been attacked haphazardly,
often in deference to wholly local interests. - The purely local
welfare has been of clearly dominant concern. In addition,
local governments, dependent on property taxes for support,
may find it understandably difficult to resist the desires of de-
velopers, even though important social or aesthetic interests are
sacrificed in the balance.13 As one commentator has recently
noted, the problem is not so much that land use decision-making
is exclusively local: "the flaw is that the criteria for decision-
making are exclusively local, even when the interests affected
are far more comprehensive.'
1 4
7. See generally R. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME (1966).
8. See generally ALI MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CoDE (Tent.
Drafts Nos. 2 & 3, 1970, 1971); NATIONAL CObnmsXssION ON URBAN PROB-
L.EMS (Douglas Commission), BUILDING THE AwMRCAN CITy (1969);
D. Heeter, supra note 3; B. Pooley, supra note 6.
9. See Feller, Metropolitanization and Land-Use Parochialism-
Toward a Judicial Attitude, 69 MiCL. L. REv. 655, 669 (1971).
10. See S. SussNA, LAND USE CONTIOI,--MORE EFFECTIVE APPROACHES
7 (published by the Urban Land Institute) (1970).
11. For a description of the problem see Note, Exclusionary Zoning
and Equal Protection, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1645, 1645-47 (1971).
12. See ALI MODEL LAND DEvELoPmENT CODE (Tent. Draft No. 3,
1971 at 1).
13. See 1 ENvmoNMNT REP.: CuimumT D vELoPmENTs 552 (No.
22, Sept. 25, 1970).
14. R. BABcocK, THE ZONING GAME 153 (1966). Essentially, the
problem is that in most cases where local interests come in conflict with
wider state or regional interests, the local governments have tended to
give inordinate deference to the local interest. Complicating this prob-
lem is the fact that traditional checks designed to safeguard the process
of local regulation have proven largely illusory. Planning commissions,
state and local, have been ineffective because their recommendations
can be given effect only if enacted at the local level by each of the local
legislatures concerned. See B. Pooley, supra note 6, at 7. In addition
the requirement that local land use regulations conform to a "compre-
hensive plan" has been largely undermined by court decisions which
have held the requirement satisfied if the local government can offer
some rational explanation for its action. See ALI MODEL LAND DEVELOP-
MENT CODE 95 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1970).
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In recent years there has been a strong trend toward foster-
ing greater state and regional participation in the land regula-
tion process. The American Law Institute, for example, re-
cently proposed a comprehensive model code providing for direct
state participation in the regulation of all (1) large scale devel-
opments, (2) developments of state or regional benefit and (3)
areas of critical state concern.15 The United States Congress is
presently considering two bills which would announce a national
land use policy and encourage, assist or possibly require the
states to develop a statewide land use plan to guide local ac-
tion. 16 To date, however, no state has enacted so complete a
program. Instead, state legislatures have chosen to enact sep-
arate measures directed at specific problem areas, e.g., (shore-
lands, power plant siting, regional development) and have at-
tempted to tailor the structure of state participation in each
case to the particular problems involved.
III. DIRECT REGULATION OF LAND USE
In some situations, a state may choose to enact regulations
which will directly control land use at the local level. Here,
the state may act on a broad scale, enacting regulations which
affect large areas of the state, or it may focus its attention only
on smaller areas with special needs. Whatever the land area
involved, direct regulation by the state will generally be em-
ployed only when there is a substantial need for some input
which only the state can provide (e.g., planning, expertise or
centralized direction) and local participation in the regulatory
process would be unfeasible or ineffective.
A. REGULATION ON A STATE-WIDE BASIS
As a starting point, it may be helpful to look at the Puerto
Rican system of land use regulation. In Puerto Rico, all power
to control land development through the exercise of zoning,
subdivision controls, official maps and the like rests with the
Puerto Rico Planning Board composed of three members ap-
pointed by the governor with the advice and consent of the
senate.' 7 Only certain rural districts are excluded from the
15. See ALI MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE (Tent. Draft No. 3,
1971).
16. See Hearings on S.632 and S.992 Before the Comm. on Interior
and Insular Affairs, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., pts.1 & 2 (1971).
17. See P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 23, § 1 et seq. (Supp. 1970).
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Board's jurisdiction.18 All subdivision plats9 and all applica-
tions for building or land use permits must conform to the
Board's regulations.20 In special cases where the "general wel-
fare" so requires, the Board may disapprove a proposed new
development even though it complies with all applicable regu-
lations.2 1
Puerto Rico's system of land use regulation is probably not
a realistic alternative within the continental United States. To
exclude local governments from all land use decisions would
upset a jealously guarded societal value 2 2 while imposing large
additional costs upon the state. Few other jurisdictions are
likely to have the money, the need or the political will to assert
such direct state control over more than a small percentage of
land use decisions.
Nevertheless, two states, Hawaii and Maine, have recently
adopted legislation which, although not as broad as Puerto
Rico's, provides for extensive state control over land use on a
state-wide basis.
1. Hawaii
Hawaii has empowered a State Land Use Commission to
divide the entire state into four zones-urban, rural, agricul-
tural, and conservation.2 3 Land use within each district is lim-
ited to the general uses delineated in the enabling statute and
the "standards" established by the commission.2 -  Actual zoning
authority is retained by the counties in urban, rural and agri-
cultural districts,2 5 but special use permits2 6 in the latter two
districts must be approved by the Commission. 2 7 Use of land
in conservation districts is regulated directly by the State De-
partment of Land and Natural Resources. 28
Hawaii's decision to exercise some state control over all
18. Id. at §§ 8, 30 (Supp. 1970).
19. Id. at § 25 (Supp. 1970).
20. Id. at § 24 (Supp. 1970).
21. Id. at § 9a (Supp. 1970).
22. See text accompanying notes 4-7 supra.
23. HAwAE REv. LAws § 205-1 et seq. (Supp. 1971).
24. Id. at § 205-2 (Supp. 1971).
25. Id. at § 205-5 (Supp. 1971).
26. Any person who desires to use his land within an agricultural
or rural district other than for an agricultural or rural use must petition
the planning commission of the county for a special permit. Id.
at § 205-6 (Supp. 1971).
27. Id.
28. Id. at § 205-5 (Supp. 1971).
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land use was prompted by several factors: (1) the development
of land for urban use was occurring in areas where it was not
economical to provide public utility services; (2) present urban
growth was sprawling into agricultural land which could better
contribute to the state through agricultural development; (3)
because of the state's limited land supply, future urban develop-
ment would require the use of some land with a high capacity
for intensive cultivation; 29 (4) tourism, upon which the state's
economy relied heavily, was dependent on the continued pres-
ervation of scenic areas and other lands in their natural state.
Each of these concerns was of state-wide importance and could
not be dealt with effectively so long as the power to regulate
land use remained exclusively in the hands of local govern-
ments. In the continental United States, however, where most
of these factors apparently do not seem as menacing, the Ha-
waiian system has yet to be directly followed.
2. Maine
Approximately 10 million acres, or roughly 60% of the land
area in Maine is unincorporated.3 0  In 1969 the state legislature
created the Maine Land Use Regulation Commission, a seven-
member board composed of the Director of Parks and Recrea-
tion, the Forest Commissioner, the State Planning Director, and
four members serving staggered four year terms to be appointed
by the governor.31 The Commission was delegated power to
enact zoning and subdivision controls for all unincorporated
areas adjacent to public roads, lakes and ponds.32
In 1971 the legislature extended the Commission's regula-
tory authority to include all unorganized and deorganized '
areas of the state.34 Under the amended statute, the Commis-
sion divides all such areas into land use guidance districts and
designates each district by one of four major classifications:
29. See F. BOSSELMN & D. CALLIES, THE Quinr REVOLUTION IN
LAND USE CONTROL 5-7 (1971).
30. Telephone interview with Mr. James Haskell, Maine Land Use
Regulation Commission, Sept. 28, 1971.
31. The appointment is made with the advice and consent of the
Council. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 683 (Supp. 1972).
32. Maine Laws 1969, ch. 494 (repealed 1971).
33. This includes essentially all areas outside the boundaries of mu-
nicipalities, i.e., all incorporated areas. Telephone interview with Mr.
James Haskell, Maine Land Use Regulation Commission, Nov. 2, 1971.
See also, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 682(1) (Supp. 1972).
34. Id. at § 681.
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protection, management, developing and holding.35 The pro-
tection, management and development district classifications re-
flect distinctions in the quantity of existing development and
the desirability of future development. That is, in protection
districts, there is little present development and it is the state's
judgment that this should continue. Management districts in-
dude primarily timber and agricultural lands. Development
districts include areas in which substantial development already
exists, and here the emphasis is on the regulation of new de-
velopment. Holding districts are areas in which substantial
future development is planned or anticipated. 3 The Commis-
sion is given authority to prepare land use guidance standards
for each district, which standards will then serve as "minimum
requirements" for proposed development.3 7 In order to preserve
some flexibility, however, the Commission may enact "special"
guidance standards38 for a particular area as necessary and may
grant variances whenever special or unusual circumstances so
demand.39 In addition, district boundaries and land use gui-
dance standards must be reviewed by the Commission at five
year intervals.40
As in Puerto Rico and Hawaii, the situation in Maine may
be unique. Prior to adoption of the new statute, power to regu-
late land use had been extended only to municipalities.41 This
35. Id. at § 685-A(I).
36. A. Protection districts shall include, but not be limited
to, areas where development would jeopardize significant natu-
ral, recreational and historic resources, including flood plains,
precipitous slopes, wildlife habitat and other areas critical to the
ecology of the region or State.
B. Management districts shall include, but not be limited to,
those lands which are currently being utilized for commer-
cial forest product or agricultural uses and for which plans for
additional development are not presently formulated nor addi-
tional development anticipated.
C. Holding districts shall include, but not be limited to, re-
serve areas adjoining development districts, for growth needed
when the development district is saturated, and those lands not
presently in development districts but for which development
plans have been submitted pursuant to section 685-B, subsection
2 or where additional development is otherwise formulated or
anticipated
D. Development districts shall include, but not be limited to,
those lands now discernible as relatively homogeneous patterns
of intensive residential, recreational, commercial, or industrial
use or commercial removal of minerals or natural resources.
M. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 685-A(1) (A)-(D) (Supp. 1972).
37. Id. at § 685-A(4).
38. Id. at § 685-A(3).
39. Id. at § 685-A(10).
40. Id. at § 685-A(9).
41. MF. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 4951 et seq. (1964).
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left large unincorporated areas of the state unregulated. As
the need for direct control of these areas grew urgent,4 2 it be-
came apparent that local governments-counties and plantations
-were too weak and too poorly organized to prepare and ad-
minister any effective scheme of regulation. A long history of
disuse of the machineries of local government, had apparently
worked its toll.43 Thus, the Maine Land Use Regulation Com-
mission was created essentially by default. Because the rapid
development of strong local governments in unincorporated
areas was neither feasible nor desirable, and because little local
opposition was expected, the Maine legislature was largely free
to adopt whatever innovative system of centralized state control
it deemed most desirable.
B. STATE ZONING OF LIMITED AREAS
For more limited purposes, direct state regulation of land
use continues to be a viable and effective method of control.
This regulation may take one of two forms. The state may
pass legislation directly prohibiting a certain use of land in a
defined area. For example, in response to recent federal legis-
lation44 every state now has passed an outdoor advertising act
which prohibits nearly all forms of billboard advertising from
areas adjacent to interstate highways.45 A 1971 Delaware stat-
ute bans heavy industry from the Delaware coast.4 0  Washing-
ton recently enacted legislation which prohibits surface drilling
for oil and gas in certain coastal water areas.4 7 These methods
of control, however, involve little or no administrative discre-
tion at the state level and therefore are not well suited to the
regulation of most types of land use. Most land use problems
require more flexible solutions.
42. Maine lies at the tip of the eastern megalopolis. In recent
years, there has been a growing need for development of recreation
sites and facilities, as well as rapidly expanding mineral development.
In addition, Maine was spending large amounts of money for pollution
abatement in incorporated areas, and it seemed silly in light of this to
allow indiscriminate development in the forests and wild areas.
Telephone interview with Mr. James Haskel, Maine Land Use Regula-
tion Commission, Nov. 2, 1972. See also F. BOSSELMAN & D. CALLIES,
supra note 29, at 187.
43. Id.
44. See 23 U.S.C. § 131(j) (1970).
45. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 173.01 et seq. (Supp. 1971).
46. See 58 Laws of Delaware, ch. 175 (1971), amending DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 7, § 7003 (1953).
47. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. app. 90.286x, § 16 (Supp. 1971).
(Vol. 56:869
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A state also may designate a state agency to formulate and
administer land use regulations in certain areas. For example,
authority to zone airport hazard areas or to regulate water sur-
face areas has frequently been given to an executive depart-
ment of the state.
1. Surface Water Zoning48
At least 37 states49 have enacted legislation designating some
level of state or local government to regulate recreational ac-
tivities on public waters.50 The statutes exhibit considerable
48. See generally, J. KUSLER, REauLATIoNs To REDUCE CONFUCTS
BETWEEN REcREATION WATER UsEs (Wisc. Dep't of Natural Resources
Research Report No. 65, 1970).
49. ALA. CODE tit. 38, §§ 97(26)-(28) (Supp. 1969); AmR. STAT.
ANN. § 21-233(b) (1968); CAL. HARB. & NAV. CODE § 660 (West Supp.
1972); CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 62-21-12 (Supp. 1965); CONN. GMT.
STAT. REV. §§ 15-136, 15-138, 15-157 (Supp. 1971); Dm1 CODE ANN. tit
23, § 2126 (Supp. 1970); FiA. STAT. ANN. § 371.59 (Supp. 1971); HAWAu
REv. STAT. § 267-15 (1968); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 24, § 11-44-2 (Smith-
Hurd 1962); ILL. ANN. STAT. ct 34, § 429.15 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1972);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 95%, § 318-1 (Smith-Hurd 1971); IoWA CODE
ANw. § 106.17 (Supp. 1972); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 82a-815, 82a-816
(1969); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:850.23, 34:851.12 (1964); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 202 (1964); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 2
(Supp. 1972); MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 90B, § 11 (1967); MYh. Coiwr.
LAws ANN. §§ 281.1011 to .1012, .1014 to .1017 (Supp. 1972); Minn.
Laws 1971, ch. 636, §§ 27-28; MIss. CODE ANN. § 8496-24 (Supp. 1971);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 306.190 (1972); NEs. REv. STAT. § 81-815.15 (1971);
NEv. REv. STAT. § 488-345 (1967); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:48-1(23) (1967);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 75-35-15 (1968); N.Y. CoNsEsv. LAw § 676(3) (Mc-
Kinney 1967); N.Y. TowN LAw § 130(17) (McKinney Supp. 1971);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75A-15 (Supp. 1971); N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-27-11
(1960); Onio REv. CODE ANN. § 1547.61 (Page Supp. 1970); Ou.A. STAT.
ANN. tit. 63, § 823 (1964); O-.A STAT. ANN. tit 82, § 862(p) (Supp.
1971); Or. REv. STAT. §§ 488.028, 488.600 (1971); RI. GEN. LAws ANN.
§ 46-22-14 (1970); S.C. CODE ANN. § 70-295.2 (1962); S.D. CoMp. LAWs
ANN. §§ 42-8-62 to 42-8-64 (1967); TENN. CODE ANN. § 70-2210 (Supp.
1971); TE. PEN. CODE ANN. art. 1722a(19), (20), (30) (Supp. 1971);
UTAn CODE ANN. § 73-18-17 (1968); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1103
(Supp. 1971); VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-182 (1968); W. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 20-7-23 (1970). Note that in succeeding footnotes references to these
statutes will be by state name only.
50. The statutes generally use the term "waters of this state," but
definitions vary as to what this term encompasses. In Delaware the
term includes all waters within state boundaries. DMi. CODE ANN
tit. 23, § 2112 (Supp. 1970). In Minnesota the term includes any
waters capable of substantial beneficial public use, and any waters
to which the public has access. MINN. STAT. § 361.02(12) (1969). In
Missouri the term excludes "bodies of water owned by a person, cor-
poration, association, partnership, municipality or other political sub-
division... ." Mo. ANN. STAT. § 306.010(6) (1972).
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variety. Thirty states5 ' place the basic regulatory authority
over surface water use in a state level department.5 2 The ma-
jority of these states give this department general regulatory
power over certain uses, provided in most cases that any po-
litical subdivision may petition the department for special rules
and regulations when particular circumstances so demand.5 8
Seven states54 place regulatory authority at the local level, either
on an exclusive basis or subject to approval by the state.", Most
of these states have large or heavily concentrated populations. 6
Apparently, where the number of potential users of state water
areas is very large, states shy away from directly assuming the
large burden of sorting and balancing the competing interests.
For those states with few water areas or smaller populations,
however, direct regulation at the state level remains the pre-
ferred approach.
51. Albama, Arkansas, Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana,
Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Ne-
braska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Ten-
nessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Vermont and West Virginia. See note
49 supra.
52. Kansas, Massachusetts, Texas and Virginia additionally permit
local governments to enact regulations subject (except in Texas) to ap-
proval by the state department. Louisiana, Maine and Tennessee ex-
plicitly exclude local governments from any power to regulate surface
water use. See note 49 supra.
53. A typical statute reads:
(2) Any subdivision of this state may, at any time, but only
after public notice, make formal application to the commission
for special rules and regulations with reference to the opera-
tion of vessels on any waters within its territorial limits and
shall set forth therein the reasons which make such special
rules or regulations necessary or appropriate.
(3) The commission is hereby authorized to make special
rules and regulations with reference to the operation of vessels,
including water skiing and other related activities, on any spe-
cific water or waters within the territorial limits of this state.
5 NEB. REv. STAT. § 81-815.15 (1971).
54. California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, New Jersey,
New York. In addition, in Ohio, power to regulate the horsepower,
size and speed of boats is reserved to conservancy districts or political
subdivisions. See note 49 supra.
55. California, Connecticut and New York require state approval
of local regulations, although it is unclear whether approval in Cal-
ifornia serves as an effective veto or is merely advisory. See CAL.
HARB. & NAV. CODE § 660 (Supp. 1972).
In addition, California and Connecticut permit the state to step in in
cases of conflict or non-uniformity between local regulations. New York
permits regional park boards to regulate waters adjacent to bathing
beaches.
56. E.g., California, Florida, Illinois, New Jersey and New York.
See note 49 supra.
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Except in the case of recent statutes,57 the scope and pur-
poses of regulation in most states is quite limited. Most of the
relevant statutes are appended to state water safety acts and
seem designed simply to give the state department some flexi-
bility in putting into effect the watercraft safety rules enunci-
ated by the statute. In addition, a large proportion of the
statutes are concerned only with regulating "the operation of
vessels," which may not include swimming, scuba diving or the
construction of docks.58 Thus the states for the most part seem
not to have viewed the problem as one of accommodating the
competing interests of those desiring access to state water areas.
Rather, the basic objective in most cases has been simply to
promote safety in the use of watercraft.50
Recently, Michigan, Minnesota and Vermont, as well as a
number of other states,60 have significantly broadened the scope
of state level regulation of surface water use. Both Michigan
and Minnesota allow a state department to enact broad surface
water zoning regulations which become law if approved by the
appropriate local government. 6 1 Upon request by local gov-
ernment and a showing that regulation would be in the public in-
terest, the Minnesota Department of Natural Resources estab-
lishes regulations to govern use of watercraft on state waters.
Prior to taking effect the regulations must be approved by a
majority of the affected counties.602  In Michigan, the Depart-
ment of Conservation is directed to draft surface zoning regu-
lations either on the Department's own initiative or at local
request, but in either case the proposed regulations must be
submitted for approval by the local government in which the
controlled waters are located.6 3 Vermont empowers its State
Water Resources Board to promulgate such surface use regula-
tions as will produce optimum use of public waters, 4 and the
statute specifically directs the Board to consider a wide range of
factors designed to ensure that the interests of all potential
users will be fully considered.6 5
57. See text accompanying notes 60-67 infra.
58. See note 53 supra.
59. Some statutes specifically so state. See, e.g., Mississippi, Texas,
Virginia, supra note 49.
60. See California, Oklahoma, North Carolina and Texas, supra
note 49.
61. Mcm Comp. LAws ANN. §§ 281.1011, .1012, .1014, .1015, .1016,
.1017 (Supp. 1972); Minn. Laws 1971, ch. 636, §§ 27, 28.
62. Minn. Laws_1971, ch. 636, § 28.
63. VIcH. ComP. LAws ANN. §§ 281.1012 to .1016 (Supp. 1972).
64. VT. STAT. ANN. tit 10, § 1103 (c) (Supp. 1971).
65. Id. at § 1103 (b) reads:
1972]
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All three statutes indicate that a direct purpose of the regu-
lation is the preservation of a valuable natural resource by
means of regulating and restricting competing uses. 0 In addi-
tion, the statutes specifically describe the kinds of regulation
which should be considered. In Minnesota, for example, the
regulations are envisioned to include restrictions on
(1) the type and size of watercraft which may use the waters
affected by the regulation, (2) the areas of water which may
be used by watercraft, (3) speed of watercraft, (4) times per-
mitted for use of watercraft, or (5) minimum distance between
watercraft.6 7
The broadened scope of this legislation is important because
it significantly increases the burden, in terms of manpower and
cost, which the state may be assuming in directly regulating the
use of waters within state borders. Some states who wish to
assert state-level influence over surface water zoning may wish
to choose methods other than direct regulation drafted at the
state level. California, 8 for example, empowers local govern-
ments to issue water use regulations but requires their submis-
sion to the State Department of Navigation and Ocean Develop-
ment for comment or approval and permits the state to regulate
directly where local regulations are in conflict. Nevertheless,
the decision that all regulations be drafted at the state level
carries with it a number of advantages. Regulation of water
areas which lie within the boundaries of several local govern-
The board in establishing rules shall consider the size and flow
of the navigable waters, the predominant use of adjacent lands,
the depth of the water, the predominant use of the waters prior
to regulation, the uses for which the water and lands are adapt-
able, the availability of fishing, boating and bathing facilities,
the scenic beauty and recreational uses of the area.
66. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1103(c) (Supp. 1971), which
reads in part:
The board shall attempt to manage the public waters and
public shorelands so that the various uses may be enjoyed in a
reasonable manner, in the best interests of all the citizens of the
state.
67. Minn. Laws 1971, ch. 636, § 28. Cf. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10,
§ 1103 (a)):
The board may establish rules to regulate the use of the public
waters and public shorelands by:(1) Defining areas on public waters and public shorelines
wherein certain uses may be conducted-(2) Defining the uses which may be conducted in the
defined areas;(3) Regulating the conduct in these areas, including but
not limited to the size of motors allowed, size of boats
allowed, allowable speeds for boats, and prohibiting the use
of motors or houseboats;(4) Regulating the time various uses may be conducted.
68. CAL. HARB. & NAY. CODE § 660 (West Supp. 1972).
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ments may be ineffective or nonuniform if the local govern-
ments fail to properly coordinate their energies. Local person-
nel may lack the time or resources to fully identify the
competing interests or to enforce regulations once enacted.
Finally, local governments may be unwilling to give full weight
to the needs and divergent interests of the regional populace
or transients who use local water areas.69
A state's decision to regulate directly surface water use
within state boundaries will place a greater burden on some
states than on others. A state like Vermont, with few water
surface areas,70 could zone directly at relatively little cost. A
state such as Michigan or Minnesota, with a proportionately
large number of water areas,7 1 could not attempt state level reg-
ulations of all lakes without a sizable increase in trained person-
nel and the expenditure of considerable time, energy and
expense. Both Michigan and Minnesota have attempted to solve
this problem by focusing state efforts on those water areas
which particularly need regulation. Michigan accomplishes this
objective directly by allowing its Department of Conservation
to choose those bodies of water for which it wishes to prepare
regulations.7 2  In Minnesota, although a county may request
state assistance for any water area, the Department of Natural
Resources will require a showing of particular need before
granting any such request.73
2. Zoning Land Near Airports
Three states, Alaska,7 4 Hawaii75 and Idaho,70 designate an
69. See J. KusLm, REULATIONS TO REDUCE CONFICTS Bmvix
REcnAmxON WATER USEs 67-73 (Wisc. Dep't of Natural Resources Re-
search Report No. 65, 1970).
70. Vermont has something more than 125 lakes and ponds. 28
ENCYCLOPEDIA AmICANA 18 (1960).
71. Michigan has more than 11,000 lakes. 19 ENCYCLOPEDIA AmE=I-
CANA 18 (1960). Minnesota also has at least 11,000 lakes. 19 ENCYCLO-
PEDiA AmCANA 201 (1960).
72. MIcH. CovM. LAws ANN. § 281.1014 (Supp. 1972). But cf. id. at§ 281.1016, stating that local governments may petition for special rules,
in which case the Department is obliged to zone. However, inasmuch
as the Department has power to regulate either on its own initiative or
at local request, it should also have the power to establish priorities
among the water areas to be regulated.
73. Interview with Michael Hambrock, Minnesota Department of
Natural Resources, Sept. 24, 1971. The Department derives this power
from the statutory requirement that regulation be determined to be in
the "public interest." Minn. Laws 1971, ch. 636, § 28.
74. ALAsxa STAT. § 02.25.010 et seq. (1962).
75. HAwmn REv. LAwS § 262-1 et seq. (1968).
76. IDAHo CoDE; A N. § 21-501 et seq. (1968).
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appropriate state agency to zone airport hazard areas, defined
as areas where high structures, trees or certain uses of land
could obstruct the airspace required for aircraft. The depart-
ment specifies permissible land uses, regulates the height of ob-
structions and requires markings and lighting within the hazard
area. A similar statute in Indiana 77 permits the State Airport
Authority to enact zoning ordinances restricting the height of
structures and regulating any emission of "air pollutants"
which might compromise the safety of the aircraft. These lim-
ited controls of limited areas impose relatively little burden on
the manpower or financial resources of the state and yet are
an effective method of regulation. A number of states, how-
ever, have chosen to allow local governments to zone airport
hazard areas.78  This may be based on the expectation that
county governments will act as responsibly as state government
where danger to life is involved.
IV. THE PERMIT STATUTES
A more passive role in land-use planning has been asserted
by the states in the areas of large scale developments, power
plant siting, trailer and mobile home parks and coastal wetlands.
Though there are notable exceptions to any generalizations
which may be drawn from the 18 statutes examined, it is gen-
erally true that in these areas the states have not taken the
initiative in determining where development should take place
or what development should be permitted. Rather, the states'
role has been largely reactive and limited to considering re-
quests for permits made by private developers. The permit
requirements, with the exception of those for power plants, are
almost uniformly of the double-veto type, i.e., the state permit
does not eliminate the need for a permit from the local govern-
mental unit with zoning authority. State power to anticipate
development by issuing regulations of statewide applicability
is rare in these statutes and authority to zone is even less com-
mon.
As has been suggested, the basic reasons for states taking
less active and less comprehensive roles in land-use planning
than the roles assumed by Hawaii and Puerto Rico are largely
77. IND. ANN. STAT. § 14-1520 (Supp. 1971).
78. See, e.g., ME. Rzv. STAT. ANN. tit. 6, § 241 et seq. (1964); Ns.




political and financial.79 Additional reasons apparent in the
permit statutes are that either the developments sought to be
regulated are unique projects, e.g., power plants, or that a con-
sensus exists on the necessity of generally prohibiting all fur-
ther development in the area, e.g., the coastal wetlands. There-
fore this section is focused more on the mechanisms established
for making decisions on permit applications than on typical
standards or prohibitions. The choice of an agency to administer
the statute, the staff available to it, the funding of the work of
the agency, the opportunities for interest group input and the
role given local officials are all vital elements of those mech-
anisms and greatly influence the final decisions.
A. LARGE-SCALE DEVELOPMENTS
The size of a development alone may indicate that its im-
pact on the environment and on population distribution will
have statewide significance. Maine and Vermont have responded
by superimposing on local zoning and licensing regulations a
requirement of state approval of large scale industrial, commer-
cial and residential developments."0 The scope of the statutes
is similar. Maine regulates commercial and industrial develop-
ments which occupy a land area in excess of 20 acres, which re-
quire waste disposal or air quality licenses from the Environ-
mental Improvement Commission, which contemplate drilling
for or excavating natural resources or which involve struc-
tures with a ground area in excess of 60,000 square feet on a
single parcel.81 Vermont includes developments involving more
than 10 acres of land (or more than one acre when within a
municipality which has not adopted permanent zoning and sub-
division bylaws), more than 10 dwelling units or construction
above the elevation of 2500 feet.8 2
The Vermont statute gives its Environmental Board spe-
cific responsibility for developing a capability and development
plan and a land use plan8 3 while the planning role of Maine's
Environment Improvement Commission is vague and apparently
79. See text accompanying note 22 supra.
80. MF REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 481 et seq. (Supp. 1972); VT.
SAT. Aix. tit. 10, § 6001 et seq. (Supp. 1971). The statutes are dis-
cussed in Walter, The Law of the Land: Development Legislation in
Maine and Vermont, 23 MAINE L. REV. 315 (1971).
81. ME. Rmv. STAT. Aim. tit. 38, § 482(2) (Supp. 1972).
82. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6001(3) (Supp. 1971).
83. Id. at §§ 6041-47.
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limited to making recommendations to the legislature."" Pro-
cedurally, the statutes also differ. In Maine approval of a pro-
posed development must be obtained from the Environmental
Improvement Commission, 5 a council of government, industry
and public representatives having statewide jurisdiction. 86 En-
forcement of the commission's orders must be accomplished by
injunctions sought by the attorney general.8 7 The Vermont
Environmental Board is provided with nine district commissions
which may make initital investigations and rulings and from
which appeals to the Board may be made.8 8 Vermont allows
the Board itself to institute actions for injunctions8 9 and imposes
penalties of $500 fines and two year prison terms for each day
a provision of the statute or rule of the Board is violated.90
The Vermont scheme, though adopted for a small and
sparsely populated state, appears to be more readily adaptable
to the requirements of rapidly developing states than the Maine
approach. The sheer number of developments in a state such
as California seems to dictate a similar division of the state into
districts; moreover, the necessity of preventing regional con-
cerns from determining decisions at the district level dictates
appellate review by an agency with statewide responsibilities.
In addition, the potential need for immediate action to prevent
irreversible harm to the environment suggests that direct legal
action by the agency is preferable to petitions to the state at-
torney general to consider and act on legal actions proposed by
the agency. Both schemes, apart from their planning provisions,
are of the double-veto type and subject to the criticism that they
merely create state permit systems which duplicate local sys-
tems. Neither provides relief for the developer who obtains
state approval but is denied a permit by a local community
considering only its own parochial interests.0 1
B. POWER PLANT SITING
The construction of 255 new power plants within the next
84. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 361 (Supp. 1972).
85. Id. at § 485.
86. Id. at § 361.
87. Id. at § 486.
88. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 6026, 6089 (Supp. 1971).
89. Id. at § 6004.
90. Id. at § 6003.
91. The American Law Institute rejected the Maine and Vermont
statutes as models for state land development codes for this reason.




20 years9 2 will see electric utility companies and industrial con-
sumers of electricity at odds with conservation groups concerned
with thermal pollution and preservation of recreation areas and
scenic resources. In contrast to the large scale development
statutes discussed above, recent power plant siting statutes typ-
ically preempt the zoning and regulatory power of local units
of government. Vermont, Maryland and New York have given
the authority to regulate the siting of power plants to existing
state agencies.93 In Vermont, where the final siting decision is
solely that of the Public Service Board, the chairman of the
Board is a full time employee while the two other members are
not.9 4 Although the Board is required to give notice of pending
applications for power plant sites to the attorney general, the
departments of Health, Forests and Parks, Water Resources,
Fish and Game, the Historic Sites Board, Scenery Preservation
Council, Aeronautics Board and planning commissions and leg-
islative bodies of affected regions and municipalities," the active
participation of these agencies in the decision is apparently op-
tional and the Board is not guaranteed the financial resources
to otherwise employ technical and professional assistance.
Maryland directs its secretary of the Department of Natural Re-
sources to treat applications to the Public Service Commission
for a certificate of public convenience and necessity associated
with power plant construction as an application for the use of
state waters9" and establishes an "environmental trust fund"
to finance extensive planning and research.9 T The trust fund,
financed by an 0.1 mil per kilowatt hour surcharge on the pro-
duction of electric energy, is not the only innovative feature of
the Maryland statute. It also authorizes the department to
stockpile potential power plant sites and to sell or lease them
to utility companies.9 8 New York, in a statute similar to that
92. The estimate is that of the Federal Power Commission. Hear-
ings on a Report Covering the Principal Policy Questions Now Facing the
Federal, Power Commission Before the Subcomm. on Energy, Natural
Resources and the Environment of the Senate Comm. on Commerce,
91st Cong., 1st Sess., at 56 (1970). For a bibliography of articles on
atomic power plant siting see Browne, The Legal Aspects of Atomic
Power Plant Development, 13 ATormc Emrms L.J. 50 (1971).
93. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 248 (Supp. 1971); MD. ANN. CODE art.
66C, § 5A (Supp. 1971); N.Y. PuB. HEALTH § 1230 (McKinney 1971).
94. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 1(b) (1970). All three members are
appointed by the governor with the consent of the state senate for six
year terms. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 3 (1970).
95. Id. at § 248 (a).
96. MD. ANx. CODE art. 66C, § 5A (Supp. 1971).
97. Id. at § 766.
98. Id. at § 769.
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of Vermont in that it lacks guarantees of technical assistance
and adequate funding, has delegated authority to regulate the
construction of power plants to the public health commis-
sioner.9 9 Utilization of existing agencies undoubtedly appealed
to budget and tax conscious Vermont and New York legislators.
Whether or not the existing agencies will develop the technical
expertise to protect the environment and procedures to provide
a public forum satisfactory to conservation groups remains to
be seen.
Other states, Washington, Arizona and Connecticut, have
created new state agencies whose sole responsibility is power
plant and transmission line siting.1 00 Membership on the new
power plant site commissions is made up of state officials and
appointed public representatives' 0 ' though Washington also pro-
vides for a temporary member representing the legislative au-
thority of the county where the proposed plant is to be lo-
cated. 10 2 Continuing review of the applicant's compliance with
the established environmental standards is provided for in each
of the statutes by granting only conditional permits'" and in
Washington and Connecticut by also granting the agencies the
power to promulgate rules and regulations.'0 4  Unique features
of each state's statute are certain to be imitated in future legis-
lation. In Washington at least one of the public hearings held
prior to certification of a site is to be conducted as an adver-
sary proceeding' °" and the state's attorney general is directed
to appoint a counsel for the environment who is to be accorded
"all the rights, privileges and responsibilities of an attorney
representing a party in a formal action . . ... ,0o In Arizona
99. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH § 1230(3) (McKinney 1971). In 1970 the New
York legislature established a temporary commission to investigate
present siting practices of utility companies and to propose legislation
on the appropriate state procedures which should be established to regu-
late and determine the siting of such facilities. New York Laws 1970,
ch. 272, § 6.
100. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40-360 et seq. (Supp. 1971); Conn.
Laws 1971, pub. act 575; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 80.50.010 et seq.
(Supp. 1971).
101. AIuZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40-360.01B (Supp. 1971); Conn. Laws
1971, pub. act. 575, Sec. 4(b).
102. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 80.50.030 (4) (Supp. 1971).
103. ARiz. Rzv. STAT. ANN. § 40-360.06(D) (Supp. 1971-72); Conn.
Laws 1971, pub. act. 525, § 10(a); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 80.50.130(2)
(Supp. 1971).
104. Conn. Laws 1971, pub. act 474(4) (e); WASH. REv. CODE ANN.
§ 80.50.040(1) (Supp. 1971).
105. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 80.50.090(3) (Supp. 1971).
106. Id. at § 80.50.080.
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persons contemplating construction of power plants are required
to annually submit ten-year plans setting forth the general
area of proposed plants and specific technical data.107 In Con-
necticut the power facility evaluation council is directed to ob-
tain written comments on site applications from the state agen-
cies concerned with pollution, health and recreation.1 0 8
Illinois has adopted a second alternative to giving the au-
thority to regulate the siting of power plants to an existing
public service commission by including regulatory power over
nuclear power plants in the grant of authority to its new Pollu-
tion Control Board.10 9 Maine combined approaches by requiring
approval of power plant sites by both its Public Utilities Com-
mission and new Environmental Improvement Commission.110
The statutes, with the exception of that of Washington,
where the agency merely makes recommendations to the gov-
ernor,"' have in common a legislative judgment that a state
agency must bear the responsibility for power plant siting de-
cisions and that the decisions must reflect a concern for en-
vironmental and public health factors as well as for power
needs. They do not, however, provide consistent answers to
the critical questions of agency resources or agency structure.
Half of the statutes discussed, those of Illinois, New York,
Maine and Vermont, do not provide special funds for the ex-
penses incurred by the agencies in evaluating applications. Ap-
parently the agencies must rely on annual legislative appropri-
ations which may or may not be sufficient. The others, except
that of Maryland which imposes a surcharge on production of
electricity, require the applicant to pay a fee which again may
or may not be adequate."12 Information resources may be lim-
ited not only by the absence of funds to employ independent
consultants but also by the absence of authority in some states
to require written reports and the cooperation of other state
agencies.
107. AIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-360.02 (Supp. 1971).
108. Conn. Laws 1971, pub. act 575, § 4(f).
109. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 , § 1025a (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1972).
The statute indicates that the immediate concern of the legislature was
with the danger of atomic radiation and not the broad range of environ-
ment problems.
110. Maine Laws 1971, ch. 476.
111. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 80.50.100 (Supp. 1971).
112. See Arm. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40-360.09(1) (Supp. 1971); Conn.




The selection of the appropriate agency for siting regulation
authority may determine whether there is to be unified review
of a site proposal or numerous inquiries involving a duplica-
tion, as in Maine. 113 Simply directing an existing public util-
ities agency to widen the scope of its present review of public
utility proposals to include environmental and health factors
may leave doubts in the minds of the public and conserva-
tionists as to the receptiveness of the agency to greater public
and interest group participation in the decision making process.
Creating a new agency, particularly one which is responsible
for site regulation but not for the existence of an adequate
supply of electrical power, may be simply replacing one agency
with a narrow interest with another.
C. TRAILER AND MOBILE HoIE PARKS
It has been suggested to state legislatures that local regu-
lation of trailer and mobile home parks has been both too
stringent and too lax." 4 Little heed has been paid to protests
against zoning which is blatantly exclusionary or which allows
development without landscaping. Only in Michigan have steps
been taken against the exclusion of mobile home parks and
those steps have been taken by the courts, which held an am-
biguous statute" 5 concerned primarily with health standards
to prohibit local governments from excluding mobile home
parks" 6 or arbitrarily refusing to zone land for their use."17
However, legislatures at the same time have been prolific in
enacting regulations on lot size, water supply and sanitary facil-
ities for the state department of health or local health officials
to enforce." s
113. See text accompanying note 110 supra.
114. Bartke & Gage, Mobile Homes: Zoning and Taxation, 55 Con-
NELL L. REV. 491 (1970). See also, Note, Zoning Restrictions Applied
to Mobile Homes, 20 CLEV. STATE L. REv. 196 (1971).
115. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 125.1001 et seq. (1967), particularly
§ 125.1016.
116. Knibbe v. City of Warren, 363 Mich. 283, 285, 109 N.W.2d 766,
767 (1961).
117. Anderson v. Township of Highland, 21 Mich. App. 64, 174 N.W.
2d 909 (1969).
118. See, e.g., KY. REv. STAT. § 219.120 et seq. (1962); MINN. STAT.
§ 327.14 et seq. (1969); Omao REV. CODE ANN. § 3733.01 et seq. (Page
1971); TENN. CODE ANN. § 53-3201 et seq. (1966); VA. CODE ANN. § 35-
61 et seq. (1970). Note, though, that in California regulations are
promulgated by the State Commission of Housing and Community De-
velopment and enforced by the Department of Housing and Community
Development unless the responsibility of enforcement is assumed by a
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While legislation on lot size provides a starting point for
state regulation of the appearance of trailer and mobile home
parks, development appears to be hampered by the lack of clear
expressions of goals. This seems to be the result of an assign-
ment of the duty of regulation of such trailer parks to agencies,
most frequently the department of health, which have no ex-
pertise in landscaping. A 1969 Vermont statute 9 attempted
to correct this situation. The statute establishes minimum
standards on lot size, off street parking, tree planting, open
space and landscaping between the park and adjacent properties
and highways.1 20  Enforcement is provided by requiring that
park developers submit site plans for approval by an agency to
be designated by the governor.121 Even the Vermont statute
is not comprehensive. It allows local governments to enact
regulations more stringent than those of the state and does not
eliminate the need for a local permit.122  The subject awaits
a more innovative and forceful handling by the states.
D. COASTAL WETLANDS
The coastal wetlands statutes 2 3 of the states on the eastern
seaboard are remarkable for their uniformity. The majority
of the statutes bring under the jurisdiction of state agencies
a very narrow strip of coastal land and permit designated agen-
cies to exercise veto power over development within the strip.
Massachusetts' definition of the territory encompassed is typi-
cal:
In this section the term "coastal wetlands" shall mean any
bank, marsh, swamp, meadow, flat or other low land subject
to tidal action or coastal storm flowage and such contiguous
land as the commissioner reasonably deems necessary to affect
by any such order in carrying out the purposes of this section.
12 4
unit of local government. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 18200 et seq.
(West Supp. 1972).
119. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6201 et seq. (Supp. 1971).
120. Id. at § 6235.
121. Id. at § 6231.
122. Id. at § 6204, and tit. 24, § 2231 et seq.
123. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 4701 et seq. (Supp. 1970-71);
MTD. ANN. CODE art. 66C, § 720 et seq. (1970); N.H. Rrv. STAT. Azw.
§ 483-A: 1 et seq. (Supp. 1971); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-229 et seq.
(Supp. 1971); R.I. GEm. LAws ANN. § 2-1-13 et seq. (Supp. 1972); MAss.
AwN. LAWS ch. 130, §§ 27A, 105 (Supp. 1971); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:
9A-1 et seq. (Supp. 1971); 58 Laws of Delaware, ch. 175 (1971). The
status of coastal wetlands regulation in California is discussed in Note,
Coastal Zone Management-The Tidelands: Legislative Apathy vs. Ju-
dicial Concern, 8 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 695 (1971).
124. Qss. ANx. LAWS ch. 130, § 105 (Supp. 1971).
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Only in Delaware does the statute, 125 delineate a significantly
larger area.
Administration of wetlands statutes is most often assigned
to a professional employee or agency of the state: in New Jersey
to the Commissioner of Environmental Protection;' 20 in Massa-
chusetts to the Commissioner of Conservation; 127 in Rhode Is-
land to the Director of Natural Resources; 128 in North Carolina
to the Department of Conservation and Development; 29 and in
Maine to the Wetlands Control Board. 30  In New Hampshire
(Water Resources Board)13 ' and in Maryland (Board of Public
Works, Secretary of Natural Resources and Agriculture Com-
mission)'1 32 not all of those holding administrative power are
paid employees of the state, but some are, and professional
staffs are available. The absence of large boards with public, in-
dustry and conservation representatives may indicate a broadly
based consensus on the extent to which development in wetlands
areas is to be permitted and a decision that continuing input
from interest groups is not required. If that is so, it is not
adequately reflected in the ambiguous guidelines contained in
statutes such as that of Maryland where the Board of Public
Works is directed in issuing permits to take into account "the
varying ecological, economic, developmental, recreational and
aesthetic values each application presents . . . . ,,'3, The suc-
cess or failure of the professional administrators in implement-
ing what they regard to be the public policy on wetlands is
certain to be noted by conservation groups and industry associa-
tions which are currently represented on decision making boards
in other areas such as power plant siting.
The method for control of development adopted by a ma-
jority of the states is to require a permit for any dredging or
filling and to authorize the administering agency to issue orders
or regulations effecting a general policy.'3 4 The lack of input
125. See text accompanying notes 158-67 infra.
126. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:9A-2 (Supp. 1971).
127. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 130, § 105 (Supp. 1971).
128. R.I. GEN. LAW ANN. § 2-1-15 (Supp. 1972).
129. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-229 (Supp. 1971).
130. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 4701 (Supp. 1970-71).
131. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 483-A: 1 (Supp. 1971).
132. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66C, §§ 721-22 (1970).
133. Id. at § 721.
134. New Jersey, New Hampshire, Maryland and Maine follow this
pattern. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:9A-2, 13:9A-4(b) (Supp. 1971); N.H.
REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 483-A:3, 483-A:4(a) (I) (Supp. 1971); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 66C, §§ 721, 722, 726 (Supp. 1971); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
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from interest groups at the decision making level arguably is
remedied by the hearings on permit applications and proposed
regulations; an amalgam of the statutory notice provisions re-
garding hearings would require that notice be published in
newspapers of general circulation in the county where the land
affected is located' 35 and be sent to affected or abutting land
owners, 3 6 municipal and county officials,1 3 7 the state planning
agency, pollution control commission, fish and game department,
division of economic development 3 " and interested federal
agencies. 3 9 Difficulty lies in the failure of each of the present
individual statutes to require notice to each of these parties and
in the inconsistency in requirements for permit and regulation
hearings. For example, in New Jersey such hearings are re-
quired prior to the promulgation of regulations but not prior
to the issuance of permits. 40  In New Hampshire 1 4 and
Maine' 42 hearings are required prior to the issuance of permits
but not of regulations. If hearings are to serve their ostensible
purpose of serving as input mechanisms and of developing a
consensus, the public hearing with notice to all interested par-
ties is essential. Similarly if a consensus is to be developed and
policy rapidly implemented, copies of permits and regulations
should be published in appropriate newspapers, sent to parties
affected, and recorded with the registrar of deeds in the coun-
ties where land affected is located. 143
§§ 4702, 4707 (Supp. 1970-71). Massachusetts and Rhode Island have
no permit requirement and North Carolina no regulations. MAsS. ANN.
LAws ch. 130, § 105 (Supp. 1971); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 2-1-15
(Supp. 1972); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-229 (Supp. 1971).
135. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:9A-3 (Supp. 1971); ME. REv.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 4701 (Supp. 1970-71); MD. ANN. CODE art. 66C,
§ 726 (Supp. 1971).
136. See, e.g., ME. Rsv. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 4701 (Supp. 1970-71);
AID. ANN. CODE art. 66C, § 724 (1970); MAsS. A-N. LAWs ch. 130, § 105
(Supp. 1971); N.H. Rsv. STAT. ANN. § 483-A:2-a (Supp. 1971); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 13:9A-3 (Supp. 1971); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-229(d)
(Supp. 1971); R.I. GSEN. LAws AN. § 2-1-15 (Supp. 1972).
137. See, e.g., ME. REv. STT. ANN. tit. 12, § 4701 (Supp. 1970-71);
Mn. ANN. CODE art. 66C, §§ 721, 722, 726 (1970); N.H. Rsv. STAT.
ANN. § 483-A:2 (Supp. 1971).
138. See, e.g., MD. A . CODE art. 66C, § 721 (1970); MASS. Am.
LAws ch. 130, § 105 (Supp. 1971); N.H. Rsv. STAT. ANN. § 483-A:2
(Supp. 1971); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-229(e) (Supp. 1971).
139. See, e.g., MD. AN. CODS art. 66C, § 721 (1970); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 113-229(e) (Supp. 1971).
140. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:9A-3, 13:9A-4 (Supp. 1971).
141. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 483-A:2, 483-A:4a (Supp. 1971).
142. M. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 4701, 4707 (Supp. 1970).
143. Recording is a feature of the Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
New Jersey and Rhode Island statutes. ME. Rsv. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
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Continuing review of compliance with wetlands statutes
and regulations is implicit in the authority to grant conditional
permits 14 4 and in the fines and penalties which may be imposed
for violations of regulations.145  Maine takes the additional step
of providing that all permits expire three years from the date
of issuance. 46 Maryland permits the secretary of natural re-
sources to require a bond securing compliance with the condi-
tions and limitations set forth in the permit.147
Adequate provision for ameliorating the effects of stringent
regulation of wetlands may not exist in a majority of the states
with wetlands statutes. The Massachusetts and Maine Supreme
Courts have held that regulations or conditional permits which
prohibit the filling of wetlands may be a "taking" without com-
pensation.14 8  Only Rhode Island and New Hampshire have pro-
grams for purchasing easements or title to lands when their
courts so hold. The Rhode Island statute provides:
If by the adoption of an order under the preceding section any
owner of the land subject to such order suffers damage, such
owner may recover compensation for such damage in an action
filed in the superior court within two (2) years from the date
of recording of such order. Awards of damages shall be paid
either from funds appropriated to carry out the purposes of§§ 2-1-13 through 2-1-17, inclusive, or from the recreation and
conservation land acquisition and development fund of 1964
established pursuant to § 32-4-15 of the general laws. 140
New Hampshire's statute is more explicit in providing for the
purchase of either perpetual negative easements or land in fee
simple. 15 0 It similarly authorizes payment from the marine
fisheries or fish and game fund,'5 1 i.e., funds related to the pur-
§ 4702 (Supp. 1970-71); MD. ANN. CODE art. 66C, § 724 (1970); MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 130, § 105 (Supp. 1971); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:9A-3
(Supp. 1971); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 2-1-15 (Supp. 1972).
144. Authority to grant conditional permits is explicit in Maine,
Maryland, New Hampshire and North Carolina. ME. REv. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12, § 4702 (Supp. 1970-71); MD. ANN. CODE art. 66C, § 727 (1970);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 483-A: 4-a (III) (Supp. 1971); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 113-229(e) (Supp. 1971).
145. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 4709 (Supp. 1970-71); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 66C, §§ 721, 730 (1970); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:9A-9 (Supp.
1971).
146. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 4702 (Supp. 1970-71).
147. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66C, § 727 (1970).
148. Commissioner of Natural Resources v. S. Volpe & Co., 349
Mass. 104, 206 N.E.2d 666 (1965). State v. Johnson, 265 A.2d 711 (Me.
1970). The Johnson decision is discussed in detail in Halperin, Con-
servation, Policy, and the Role of Counsel, 23 MAINE L. REv. 119 (1971).
149. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 2-1-16 (Supp. 1972).




poses bf the wetlands statute. Without legislation of this type,
a state may be faced with the alternatives of permitting uses of
wetlands which will thwart the purposes of its wetlands act
and purchasing the land in fee simple. The Massachusetts and
Maine decisions are cases in point. Under the New Hampshire
statute permission to construct a small marina and an access
to homes on the uplands could have been combined with the pur-
chase of a perpetual negative easement prohibiting filling of
and construction on the marsh.
Local governments lose only the power to be less restrictive
than the state government under wetlands statutes enacted to
date. While some state administrators harbor hopes of dictating
wetlands policy to local governments without the possibility of
being rebuffed by more restrictive local regulations, 15 2 recent
decisions clearly indicate that the hopes are unfounded. The
Massachusetts Supreme Court's interpretation of the Massachu-
setts Wetlands Act would appear to be equally applicable to
the statutes of other states:
We find nothing in the language of the Act expressly, implied-
ly or inferentially suggesting that municipalities are deprived or
preempted from exercising regulatory controls of wetlands
situated therein by means of zoning by-laws .... The Act
does not attempt to create a uniform statutory scheme. It es-
tablishes minimum statewide standards leaving local communi-
ties free to adopt more stringent controls.'53
Active participation by local officials in decisions to grant or
withhold state permits is provided for in a number of statutes.
In Massachusetts and Maine hearings on applications for state
permits are conducted by local officials; 5 4 in Maryland and New
Hampshire notice of permit application hearing is given to local
officials; 155 in North Carolina the local officials not only receive
notice but may force a review of a decision contrary to their
recommendations.' 5 6 Provision for consultation with local offi-
cials before regulations are promulgated is much less common.
At present only Maryland's Private Wetlands Act now so pro-
vides. 157 Experience will reveal the degree and nature of co-
152. Interview with Vernon Nolton, Engineer, New Hampshire Wa-
ter Resources Board, Oct. 14, 1971.
153. Golden v. Board of Selectmen of Falmouth, 265 N.E.2d 573,
576-77 (Mass. 1970).
154. MF Rnv. STA . ANN. tit. 12, § 4701 (Supp. 1970-71); MAss.
ANN. LAws ch. 130, § 27A (Supp. 1971).
155. In. ANN. CODE art. 66C, §§ 721, 726 (1970); N.H. REv. SmT.
ANN. § 483-A:2 (Supp. 1971).
156. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-229(e), (f) (Supp. 1971).
157. M . AN. Co .art. 66C, § 722 (1970).
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operation by state agencies and local officials required for ef-
fective wetlands control. It may indeed be necessary for the
states to preempt the field. In the interim the requirements of
notice to and consultation with local officials on permit decisions
and regulations seem politically wise.
Delaware's statute is unique among the coastal wetlands
acts in that it protects a strip of coast and subaqueous land
from one to five miles wide1 58 and in this zone absolutely pro-
hibits further development of heavy industry and offshore bulk
transfer facilities. 15 9  Development for other manufacturing
uses is allowed only by a permit issued by the State Planner
or, on appeal from his decision, by the Coastal Zone Industrial
Control Board.1 60
In other respects the Delaware statute is similar to the
statutes of the other eastern seaboard states and as the most
recent it is a disappointment. There is no requirement that
notice of hearings on initial permit applications and on regula-
tions be published or be mailed to federal, state and local agen-
cies or adjacent landowners,1 61 and plans and guidelines restrict-
ing the use of specific areas need not be filed with registrars
of deeds. 162 The public members of the Coastal Zone Industrial
Control Board serve without compensation and without pro-
fessional staff other than that which might be provided by
state department heads who also serve on the board. 10 3  There
is no explicit provision for issuing conditional permits and for
injunctions the Board must rely on action by the attorney
general. 64 While there is provision for the acquisition of fee
simple and lesser interests in land, funding is unclear.105
Finally, no permit may be granted "unless the county or munici-
pality having jurisdiction has first approved the use in question
by zoning procedures provided by law."'166 The Delaware stat-
ute, indeed, may be significantly worse than its counterparts
because permits are required only for the "expansion or exten-
sion of non-conforming manufacturing uses"'10 7 rather than for
158. 58 Laws of Delaware, ch. 175 (1971).
159. Id. at § 7003.
160. Id. at § 7004(a).
161. Id. at § 7005(a) & (b).
162. Id. at § 7005(c).
163. Id. at § 7006.
164. Id. at § 7010.
165. Id. at § 7009.




any dredging, filling or construction, and apparently non-
manufacturing development may continue apace.
V. STATE GUIDANCE OF LOCAL REGULATION: MINI-
MUM STANDARDS, MODEL ORDINANCES, et aL
It seems unlikely that many states will follow the example
of Hawaii or Puerto Rico toward centralized control over all
land use decisions. Many land use proposals will have no major
impact beyond the local level. 1 8 Others would involve too
heavy an expense if administered at the state level. In order
to channel state energies into important areas without unneces-
sarily increasing the cost or bureaucratization of the land devel-
opment process, many states have chosen to focus their attention
on such areas of critical state concern60  as shorelands or flood
plains. Though the structure of such regulation has taken many
forms, a major portion of it requires the state to carry out two
basic functions: (1) to provide affirmative guidance to local
governments, usually in the form of minimum standards or a
model ordinance, and (2) to review and approve all local regu-
lations to ensure compliance with enunciated state-wide objec-
tives. This latter function is usually augmented by authority
to enact conforming regulations for any local government which
fails to satisfy state requirements.
A. SHORELANDS
Statutory attempts to regulate the use of shorelands from
the state level can be broken down into two categories. One
group of statutes 7 0 is directed toward all or nearly all"I shore-
land areas within the state and seeks to coordinate the develop-
ment of these areas in a manner consistent with statewide
interests. The second group'172 seeks to identify only those
168. See ALI MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE 5 (Tent. Draft No. 3,
1971).
169. The ALI MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE § 7-201 (Tent Draft
No. 3, 1971) includes provision for designation by the state of "districts
of critical state concern." Notes following this section define such dis-
tricts as areas in which "land development proposals have a state or
regional impact because of the nature of the land on which they are
located. .. ."
170. Maine, Minnesota, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin. See Part
V(A) (1) infra.
171. Wisconsin and Minnesota exclude shorelands in "unincorporated
areas." MINw. STAT. § 105.485(3) (Supp. 1971); Wis. STAT. ANN.§ 59.971(1) (Supp. 1971).
172. See Part V(A) (2) infra.
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shoreland areas within the state which, because of their scenic
or ecological importance, need to be preserved in an essentially
natural state.
1. Ensuring Orderly Development
Five states recently have enacted comprehensive shoreland
protection statutes173 designed to foster the planned and orderly
development of state shorelands. Though the specific descrip-
tions vary, "shoreland" is generally defined as land which ex-
tends to somewhere between 250 and 1,000 feet 174 from the ordi-
nary high water mark175 of water areas 176 which are either
"navigable"'177 or which meet a certain minimum acreage.' 7
Each of the statutes calls upon local governments to adopt
zoning and subdivision controls for the regulation of these
shoreland areas.179 If prior to a stated future date °8 0 the local
173. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 4811 et seq. (Supp. 1972); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 105.485 (Supp. 1971); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1104
(Supp. 1971); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 4410a (Supp. 1971); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. App. 90.286x (Supp. 1971); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 59.971,
144.26 (Supp. 1971).
174. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4811 (Supp. 1972) (250 ft.); MINN. STAT.
§ 105.485(2) (Supp. 1971) (1000 ft. from a "lake, pond, or flow-
age;" 300 ft. from "river or stream or the landward side of flood plain"
on such river or stream, "whichever is greater"); VT. STAT. ANN., tit. 10,§ 1101 (b) (Supp. 1971) (between 500 and 1000 feet); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 59.971(1) (Supp. 1971) (same as Minnesota). The Washington statute
does not provide for a distance in feet).
175. Only Washington specifically defines this term. See WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. App. 90.286x. § 3(2) (b) (Supp. 1971).
176. Vermont excludes rivers from the coverage of its statutes.
See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1101 (6) (Supp. 1971).
177. This is the test in Maine and Wisconsin. ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12, § 4811 (Supp. 1972); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 59.971(1) (Supp. 1971).
Washington excludes shorelines upstream from a point where the mean
annual flow is 20 cubic feet per second or less, and also excludes
shorelines on lakes less than 20 acres in size. WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. App. 90.286x (3) (2) (d) (Supp. 1971).
178. Vermont requires the relevant "lake or pond" to exceed 20
acres. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1101(6) (Supp. 1971). Minnesota's
statute applies to all "public waters." The Minnesota Department of
Natural Resources has defined this term to mean at least 25 acres for a
lake, or a total drainage area of 2 square miles for a river. Minn. Con-
servation Regs. § 70(d) (1970). Washington has a similar provision.
See note 177 supra.
179. Local zoning enabling legislation generally includes the re-
quirement that local zoning be conducted in conformance with a com-
prehensive plan. See ALI MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE App. B
(Tent. Draft No. 1, 1968). At least one state, Minnesota, has amended
its basic statute to require considerations affecting "the conservation of
shorelands" to be included in the comprehensive plan. MINN. STAT.
§§ 394.25, 396.03 (Supp. 1971). One of the problems this raises is
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government fails to adopt such an ordinance or adopts an ordi-
nance which fails to meet standards established by the state
agency, that agency is empowered to adopt suitable ordinances
for the local government thereafter to be administered and en-
forced at the local level.
In Maine, Vermont and Washington, State guidance of
shoreland development is intended to extend to all shorelands
within the state, both in urban and rural areas. This intention
is reflected by the choice of particular units of local government
to prepare the shoreland ordinances. Washington delegates this
responsibility to "any county, incorporated city, or town."18 1 In
Vermont, the duty to enact local ordinances is charged to "mu-
nicipalities," defined to include both incorporated units and "un-
organized town(s) or gore(s)."' 82 Maine's shoreland protection
statute applies only to organized areas of the state'8 3 since only
cities and towns are given power to regulate land use.'84 How-
ever, shorelands in unorganized areas of the state are already
regulated directly by the Maine Land Use Regulation Commis-
sion, as noted earlier.185
In contrast to these states, Minnesota and Wisconsin have
chosen to impose state guidelines on shoreland development
only within "unincorporated"'8 30 areas of the state. Accordingly,
only county governments are required to zone in accordance
with state guidelines'87 while cities and villages remain un-
whether the local government would be required to reformulate its
comprehensive plan before enacting shoreland regulations consistent
with the statute. This would seem obviously at odds with the legislative
purpose.
180. The time period between enactment of the statute and the
deadline for local enactment of shoreline ordinances is approximately as
follows in the various states: Maine-2 yrs.; Minnesota-3 years plus;
Vermont-3 years minus; Washington-2% years; Wisconsin-18 months.
181. WASH. REV. CODE AN. App. 90.286 § 3 (1) (c) (Supp. 1971).
182. VT. STAT. Axm. tit. 24, § 4303(4) (Supp. 1971).
183. Only "municipal units of government pursuant to presently
existing enabling legislation" are authorized to act under the statute
(ME REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 4812 (Supp. 1972) ) and their powers to
regulate shorelines will in general be limited to areas within municipal
boundaries. Telephone interview with Mr. James Haskell, Maine Land
Use Regulation Commission, Sept. 28, 1971.
184. ME REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 4811 et seq. (Supp. 1972). "Mu-
nicipality" is defined to include only cities and towns. M. REv. STAT.
ANx. tit. 30, § 1901(6) (1964).
185. See note 32 supra.
186. In Minnesota, "unincorporated" is defined to mean the area
"outside a city, village, or borough." Mn;N. STAT. § 105.485(2) (Supp.
1971).
187. Id. at § 105.485(4); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 59.971(1) (Supp. 1971).
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affected. This decision is probably explained by three primary
factors. First, inclusion of municipal shorelands in the regula-
tory scheme would have been politically unpopular and might
have jeopardized the passage of the bills.188 Second, the notion
existed that because of the substantial amount of existing de-
velopment, many shorelands within municipal boundaries were
beyond the stage where restriction of future development would
have any significant impact on shoreland use. 189 Third, this be-
lief, coupled with the fact that both Minnesota and Wisconsin
contain a large number of water areas suggested that the most
productive and beneficial use of the limited funds and man-
power available would be to concentrate on those areas where
control of future land use would have its most significant im-
pact, namely, non-urban areas.190
This approach nevertheless carries with it a number of
potential difficulties. Use of water areas lying within unin-
corporated districts may be affected directly by shoreland use
regulations in incorporated areas. A second problem may in-
volve the effects of municipal annexation. If a municipality
seeks to annex a previously unincorporated shoreland area for
use in a development project which benefits the municipality,
should it make a difference that the proposed development
would violate a previously enacted county shoreland ordinance,
passed specifically in response to the state statute?' 91 These
and other problems may have to be dealt with by future legis-
lation.
a. The State's Role in Shoreland Management
The state's role of supervising local regulatory efforts is
carried out in the different states by a variety of different state
departments. Wisconsin and Washington place all authority
in a single agency. In Wisconsin, it is the Department of Nat-
ural Resources which establishes standards and criteria, adopts
a model ordinance, and reviews local ordinances.' 9 2 In Wash-
188. Interview with Mr. Mike Hambrock, Minnesota Department of
Natural Resources, Nov. 17, 1971.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. See Maine Laws ch. 457, § 5 (1971), amending ME. REv. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, § 685-A(4) (1964), providing that an unincorporated area
regulated by the Maine Land Use Regulation Commission and subse-
quently annexed by a municipality will remain subject to the Commis-
sion's controls until the municipality adopts land use regulations no
less protective than the Commission's.
192. WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 59.971, 144.26 (Supp. 1971).
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ington, the Department of Ecology, a new department created
in 1970 as a composite of a number of old agencies,19 3 performs
the same functions. 94 Minnesota places primary responsibility
in its Commissioner of Natural Resources, but any model stand-
ards or ordinances which the Commissioner adopts must be
approved by the Board of Health and the Pollution Control
Agency.' 95 In addition, these agencies together with a number
of others provide "information and advice" to the Commissioner
as necessary. 961
Maine and Vermont have adopted a more decentralized ap-
proach to shoreland management. In Maine, the Environmental
Commission and the Land Use Regulation Commission are given
co-operative authority to review local ordinances. 97 If these
ordinances fail to comply with state standards, the two com-
missions must consult with a third agency, the State Planning
Office, before adopting conforming regulations.198 In Vermont,
the Department of Water Resources provides the standards and
criteria for shoreland bylaws. 9 9 The Department then assists
the Central Planning Office in preparing model bylaws.200  A
Department subdivision, the Water Resources Board, is respon-
sible for reviewing local bylaws and, where necessary, adopting
bylaws for the local government.20'
The choice to centralize or decentralize state supervision
over local regulation is of significance in a number of respects.
Decentralization has the advantage of allowing a wider range of
interests to participate in the development of a workable shore-
lands management program.20 2  Environmental concerns may
193. This included the Water Pollution Control Commission, the
Department of Water Resources, the air pollution functions of the
Department of Health and the State Air Pollution Control Board and
solid waste disposal functions of the Department of Health. WAsH.
R-v. CODE AN. § 43.21A.060 (Supp. 1971).
194. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. App. 90.286x (Supp. 1971).
195. MN N. STAT. § 105.485 (3) (Supp. 1971).
196. Id.
197. MT. Rv. STAT. ANiN. tit. 12, § 4813 (Supp. 1972).
198. Id.
199. VT. SmT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1104(a) (Supp. 1971). "By-law" is de-
fined in VT. STAT. AnN. tit. 24, § 4401(b) (Supp. 1971) to include zoning
and subdivision regulations, official maps, and a capital budget and
program-
200. VT. STAT. AWN. tit. 10, § 1104(a), (b) (Supp. 1971).
201. Id. at tit. 24, § 4410a (d).
202. In Maine, for example, the Land Use Regulation Commission is
composed of representatives of the public, conservation interests, forests
products industry interests, and general landowner interests, among
others. See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 683 (Supp. 1972). By
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need to be supplemented by exposure to long-range planning
considerations or the interests of private land-owners or de-
velopers. To adopt a single agency approach, as Wisconsin has
done, could make it less likely that these interests will be ade-
quately aired.20 3 On the other hand, diffusing responsibility
over a number of different departments may lead to inadequate
coordination and the duplication of functions.20 4 In Maine, for
example, failure to designate one agency as the superior au-
thority has led to a situation in which "everybody's trying to do
it all" and "there's a lot of buck-passing. ' 20  Decentralized
state supervision also may hinder the state's ability to define
goals and publicize objectives to the local community. Without
some single executive spokesman, local governments may be un-
sure of their responsibilities and community support for the
overall objectives of the shorelands program may be retarded.2 0 0
Solutions to these problems may be elusive. Washington
has created a Department of Ecology, combining the environ-
mental and pollution control functions of a number of older
agencies into one new department. 20 7 By placing this depart-
ment in charge of shoreland management, the state may ensure
a more complete consideration of environmental concerns, but
long range planning interests and economic development needs
may still go unnoticed. 20 8  In addition, it may be inefficient or
unfeasible in some states to combine different agencies into one
department. Space requirements, fear of increased bureau-
cratization and inefficiency or the overlapping of functions pres-
ently carried on within existing agencies may each make this
solution seem less attractive.
including the Commission in land use decisions, the state ensures that
these interests will be heard. But cf. MINNESOTA CITIZENS LEAGUE,
NEEDED: BETTER WAYS OF MAKING ENVIRONMENTAL CHOICES 12 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as CITIZENS LEAGUE REPORT], suggesting that the prac-
tice of appointing representatives of special interests to these kinds of
commissions has been "excessive."
203. This would depend, of course, upon the extent to which all
relevant interests were represented within the Department, and/or the
degree to which the Department voluntarily solicited the opinions of
outside interests in making its decisions.
204. See, e.g., CIrzENs LEAGUE REPORT, supra note 202, at 10-11.
205. Telephone interview with Mr. James Haskel, Maine Land Use
Regulation Commission, Sept. 28, 1971.
206. See CITizENs LEAGUE REPORT, supra note 202, at 10-11.
207. See note 193 supra.
208. For example, the State Land Planning Commission created
(WASH. REV. CODE ANN. App. 43.287x, §§ 1-10 (Supp. 1971) ) for the
purpose of planning and encouraging the wise use of land throughout
the state, remains autonomous from the Department of Ecology.
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Perhaps the best solution is the one adopted in Minnesota.
By placing primary authority in a single agency, the state min-
.mizes duplication of effort and establishes a single executive
spokesman for shoreland management. By giving other agen-
cies some veto authority, and by requiring that all agencies
with an interest furnish the central agency with necessary
"information and advice," the state increases the likelihood that
all relevant interests will be heard.
b. The Washington Shoreline Management Act
Though a number of other comparisons could be made, it
seems advisable here simply to attempt some general description
of the Maine, Minnesota, Vermont and Wisconsin statutes taken
together, and then contrast this description with the Washing-
ton statute, a law considerably more comprehensive and sophis-
ticated than any other of the acts. All of the former statutes
are quite brief. Local governments retain considerable flexi-
bility to regulate shoreland use, limited only by the statutory
deadline for enactment of controls and the minimum standards
established by the state.209 There are no express provisions for
continuing state review of local action, although at least one
state agency has tried to create such a power by means of its
rule-making authority.2 10  Granting of variances remains
wholly a local function. This absence of continuing state in-
volvement simplifies the regulatory process and may encourage
greater local autonomy. However, it also presents the danger
that state shoreland policy, as enunciated by the statutes and
departmental guidelines, may be circumvented in some cases by
unwise or irresponsible local action. These states run the risk
that informed zoning decisions by local governments will con-
tinue only to the point of initial compliance with the state
guidelines.
209. It is possible that the state agency may attempt to impose
stricter requirements in some areas by means of its rule-making
power. For example, the Minnesota Department of Natural Resources
requires that preliminary plans for cluster developments in shoreland
areas must be approved by the Commissioner prior to enactment
Minn. Conservation Regs. § 74(d) (1) (1970).
210. See Wis. ADm. CODE § NR 115.04(2) (b) (1971), which reads:
Compliance status shall also be maintained by the county dur-
ing subsequent reevaluation of the regulations to ascertain
their effectiveness in maintaining the quality of Wisconsin wa-
ter. A county shall keep its regulations current, effective and
workable to retain its status of compliance. Failure to do so
shall be deemed noncompliance.
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If the local governments balk at enacting suitable ordi-
nances within the statutory time limit, the state agency may
enact ordinances for the local government, which the latter
must then administer and enforce.2 11 The specific procedures
by which this is to be accomplished are left to the discretion of
the state agency.2 12 However, many state agencies may be
understandably reluctant to impose their will too quickly on the
local authorities.213 For example, when only a few counties
were able to comply with the January 1, 1968, deadline in Wis-
consin, the Department of Natural Resources chose to continue
to encourage county enactment of shoreland regulations rather
than impose its own controls upon the counties.21 4 In light of
the Wisconsin experience, provisions which establish detailed
procedures for possible state enforcement of an imposed ordi-
nance, 215 or which provide that local governments will bear all
costs incurred by the state in adapting the model ordinance
to a local area,21 6 may prove to be little more than "jawboning."
In contrast to other shoreland protection statutes, the Wash-
ington statute2 1 7 treats these and other problems with consid-
erable sophistication. Citing what it calls "the inherent harm
in an uncoordinated and piecemeal development," 218 the statute
establishes a three level process for local enactment of use regu-
lations: within six months of the effective date of the act, local
governments must submit to the Department of Ecology a letter
of their intention to comply with other provisions of the stat-
211. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 4813 (Supp. 1972); MINN. STAT.
§ 105.485(4) (Supp. 1971); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 4410a(d) (Supp.
1971); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 59.071(6) (Supp. 1971).
212. The statutes state simply that if a local government fails to
enact a satisfactory ordinance, the state department shall enact such an
ordinance for the county. However, in light of the time and expense
which this would involve, coupled with the fact that shoreland regula-
tion is unlikely to be effective without the support and cooperation
of the local government, most state departments will probably be flexi-
ble in their performance of the statutory mandate. See note 214 infra.
213. See note 212 supra.
214. See Kusler, Water Quality Protection for Inland Lakes in Wis-
consin: A Comprehensive Approach to Water Pollution, 1970 Wis. L. REV.
35, 63 n.127 (1970).
215. See VT. STAT. ANN. § 4410a(d) (Supp. 1971), which provides
that if a municipality fails to administer a shoreland bylaw adopted for
it by the state, the State Water Resources Board and Department of
Water Resources shall administer it jointly, assessing all costs incurred
to the municipality.
216. See MINN. STAT. § 105.485(5) (Supp. 1971).
217. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. App. 90.286x, § 1 et seq. (Supp. 1971).
218. Id. at § 2.
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ute;2 19 within eighteen months the local government must have
completed a comprehensive inventory of all shoreland within
its jurisdiction;220 within eighteen months from the time the
Department has adopted its guidelines (or approximately two
years and nine months221 from the effective date of the statute)
the local government must have completed a master program
for regulation of shoreland use.22 2  This requirement that a
local government demonstrate compliance at three stages of the
enactment process should assure that the long process of design-
ing workable regulations begins quickly and continues evenly
until final enactment of the master program. In the interim, that
is, prior to final adoption of a master program, local governments
may deny necessary development permits for any proposed de-
velopment which is inconsistent with the policies of the act,
departmental guidelines, or the master program being developed
for the area, to the extent this can be ascertained. -2 2 3  State
funds are provided on a matching basis to aid local governments
in the preparation of a master program.2 24 This should further
encourage local cooperation.
219. Id. at § 7(1).
220. Id. at § 8(1).
221. The Department of Ecology is given a maximum of 450 days
from the effective date of the statute to enact its guidelines. Id. at § 6
(1). Eighteen months plus 450 days is approximately 2 years and 9
months.
222. Id. at § 8(2).
223. Id. at § 14(2) (a). One of the problems that arose under
Minnesota's shorelands statute was whether counties could enact tem-
porary ordinances pending completion and approval of final ordinances.
See Mnm. Op. A=nr. Gm. 983-S, July 28, 1970. Washington's solution
of simply giving local governments a veto authority over proposed
development (by denying the necessary permit to the developer) seems
superior to the temporary ordinance approach, since (1) preparation of
such ordinances may siphon considerable time away from the local gov-
ernments main task of developing a cohesive program of regulation,
and (2) temporary ordinances, to the extent they are based on a less
than complete collection and study of the relevant considerations, may
have few advantages over Washington's case by case approach, and may
in fact have the serious disadvantage of prejudging certain develop-
ments without full knowledge of all applicable considerations. But cf.
Maine Laws 1971, ch. 457, amending M_ REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§ 685-A(6) (1964), granting the Maine Land Use Regulation Commis-
sion power to adopt interim guidance standards for development in un-
incorporated areas of the state. See also Freilich, Interim Development
Controls: Essential Tools for Implementing Flexible Planning and Zon-
ing, 49 3. OF URBAN LAw 65 (1971). Washington's approach has the
added advantage that interim veto authority presumably can be ex-
ercised more and more knowledgeably as the local government moves
closer to final enactment of its master program.
224. WASH. REv. CODE Am. App. 90.286x, § 25 (Supp. 1971).
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In order to become "use regulations," local master programs
must be approved by the Department. 225  For this purpose,
State shorelands are broken down into two groups: (1) "shore-
lines of state-wide significance," that is, those shorelines desig-
nated by the legislature which, because of their size or use,
are of significant statewide importance;220 and (2) "shorelines,"
defined to include all other shorelines except those adjacent to
certain small water areas, as defined by statute.22 7  In order to
receive department approval, master programs for "shorelines"
must be "consistent with" statutory policy and the Department's
guidelines. 22 If approval is denied, the master program is re-
submitted to the local government with suggested modifications.
The local government makes necessary revisions and may re-
submit its program to the Department within 90 days. 229 This
process is continued until such time as full compliance with
statutory policies is achieved, or the Department in its discretion
determines that its power to enact use regulations for the local
government must be invoked.230
With respect to "shorelines of state-wide significance," the
Department may withhold its approval if in its opinion the local
master program fails to achieve an "optimal" implementation
of the policies of the act. 231 Again, however, the Department's
first step upon disapproval must be to return the program with
suggested modifications to the local government. If the local
government then fails to resubmit an acceptable program, the
Department may develop and adopt an alternative.2 3 2 In the
case of either "shorelines" or "shorelines of state-wide signifi-
cance," the local government is free to appeal any guidelines or
imposed use regulations to a state hearing board.2 3  In addi-
tion, a local government may always continue to develop its
own master program which, when approved by the Department,
225. Id. at § 10(1).
226. Id. at § 3(2) (e).
227. Id. at § 3(2)(d).
228. Id. at § 9(1).
229. Id.
230. Id. at § 7(2) states that the Department shall enact an ordi-
nance for the local government when the latter fails to conform to the
time schedule provided in the statute. However, under Section 9 (1) the
Department apparently has the authority to continue the process of re-
submitting unsatisfactory ordinances to the local government as long as
it wishes.
231. Id. at § 9(2).
232. Id.
233. Id. at § 18(4).
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will supercede any regulations imposed by the Department. 23 4
Although heavy emphasis is placed on local governments
being heard at all steps of the process, significant controls are
retained at the state level. In addition to general statutory
guidelines, 235 the model guidelines promulgated by the Depart-
ment, and the Department's power to disapprove local master
programs, the state retains, through the Department, the power
to require local governments to enact master programs by seg-
ments so that areas of immediate concern may be given priority
in enacting regulations. 23 The Department also has the au-
thority to require local governments to cooperate in the adop-
tion of a regional master program where necessary. -2 3 T This
should provide an effective mechanism for the regulation of
shoreland areas which overlap local boundaries or which service
a regional population.
The statute establishes a comprehensive scheme to ensure
continuing local compliance with legislative objectives. First, all
variances granted by a local government must receive prior ap-
proval by the Department.2 38  Second, a sophisticated adminis-
trative appeals procedure is created under which the Depart-
ment can challenge nonconforming shoreland development.
Under the statute, any development with a total cost exceeding
$1,000 or which "materially interferes with" water or shoreline
use requires a "development permit" from the appropriate local
government. 39  "Any person aggrieved" may challenge the
granting or denial of such a permit by appealing to the Shore-
lines Hearings Board,240 a quasi-judicial body with state-wide
jurisdiction established specifically to resolve disputes involving
use of shorelands. There are three methods by which the De-
partment either may involve itself directly in this appeals
process or initiate appeals of its own. If a "person aggrieved"
challenges the permit, the Department may intervene to protect
the public interest and ensure compliance with statutory pur-
poses.2 41  Second, the Department may appeal issuance of a
permit directly, by filing a written request with the Hearings
234. Id. at § 9(3).
235. See id. at §§ 2, 10, 15, 16, 32.
236. Id. at § 11(2).
237. Id. at § 11(1).
238. Id. at § 14(11).
239. Id. at 8 14(2).




Board.24 2 Third, if the Department believes that conditions of
an existing permit are no longer being observed, it may request
the Board to rescind the permit.24 3 Taken together, these pro-
cedures seem to afford an effective vehicle for continuing state
review of local regulation and a measure of assurance that un-
wise local action will not be tolerated.
The Washington statute represents an attempt to develop
a constructive, reasonable and workable program for shoreland
regulation. Throughout the statute the recurrent theme is that
shoreland regulation must be a co-operative venture, with state
and local governments working in concert to accomplish mu-
tually desirable objectives. Retained control by the state is
broad enough to discourage ill advised or irresponsible local
action. Yet, for the most part, such control is limited to a
secondary review and is not designed to usurp primary respon-
sibility for administration of the shorelines program from the
local government. 244 Thus there are no threats and few abso-
lute deadlines. Local governments are given a realistic time-
table and an intelligent working plan for the enactment of a
master program. If they meet this schedule, they can expect
to be allowed to work out with the Department any differences
or nonconformities which still exist between the local program
and state guidelines. Any unresolved disagreements can be set-
tled by administrative review by the Shorelines Hearings Board.
The overall program seems likely to be effective.
2. Preservation in a Natural State
In contrast to those states which have sought merely to en-
sure orderly development, a number of states have established
state level control of shorelands for the purpose of prohibiting
most development and preserving the designated areas in an
essentially natural state. Prompted most likely by the possi-
bility of federal aid in connection with the recently established
federal scenic rivers program,245 at least 11 states24 0 have
242. Id. at § 18(2).
243. Id. at § 14(7).
244. Id. at § 5, which reads as follows:
This chapter establishes a cooperative program of shoreline
management between local government and the state. Localgovernment shall have the primary responsibility for initiating
and administering the regulatory program of this chapter.
The department shall act primarily in a supportive and review
capacity with primary emphasis on insuring compliance with
the policy and provisions of this chapter.
245. 16 U.S.C. § 1271 et seq. (Supp. 1972).
246. See GA. CODE ANN. § 17-901 et seq. (1971); IOWA CODE ANN.
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recently enacted scenic river statutes. Most of these statutes
are not of much interest in a discussion of state land use regu-
lation, either because they apply only to the river channel,2 "
or because they are entirely prospective in the sense that a state
agency is merely empowered to submit a plan for scenic river
regulation for subsequent adoption by the state legislature,248
or because the state has not yet involved itself in the regulatory
process in any significant way.249 However, at least three states,
Tennessee, Michigan and Iowa, have passed comprehensive sce-
nic river statutes which may serve as models for other states
planning to adopt such programs in the near future.2 50 In addi-
tion, the Michigan legislature passed a "Shoreland Protection
and Management Act,"25 1 designed to protect high-risk and en-
vironmental areas from unwanted development.
a. Scenic River Statutes
The Tennessee scenic river act2 52 places nearly all regula-
tory power at the state level. The statute establishes a scenic
river system comprised of three classes of river areas: natural,
or wild areas; pastoral areas, in which rural or agricultural uses
predominate; and partially developed areas, defined as those
areas affected by "the works of man" but which still possess
actual or potential scenic values.2 5 3 All rivers initially to be in-
cluded in the system are designated by the legislature. 54 Any
additions or changes in classification are permitted only with
legislative approval.255  The statute describes the policies and
purposes to be furthered by regulation in each class of rivers2 50
§ 108A.1 et seq. (Supp. 1971); L. REv. STAT. § 56:1841 et seq. (Supp.
1971); MD. ANN. CODE art. 66C, § 759 et seq. (1970); Micm Coup. LAws
ANN. §§ 281.761-.776 (Supp. 1971); OHIO Rlv. CODE ANN. §§ 1501.16-.19
(Supp. 1970); Okla. Laws 1970 (2d Sess.), ch. 68; TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 11-1401 et seq. (Supp. 1970); VA. CODE ANN. § 10-167 et seq. (Supp.
1970); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-5B-1 et seq. (1970); Wis. STAT. ANN.§ 30.26 (Supp. 1971).
247. Oklahoma and West Virginia. See note 246 supra.
248. Maryland and Virginia. See note 246 supra.
249. Georgia, Louisiana, Ohio and Wisconsin. See note 246 supra.
250. Comprehensive bills have recently been introduced in Arkan-
sas, Kentucky, Minnesota, Oregon and other states. More information
can be received by writing the Department of Interior, Washington, D.C.
251. icH. CoAin. LAws ANN. §§ 281.631-.645 (Supp. 1971).
252. TENN. CODE ANN. § 11-1401 et seq. (Supp. 1970).
253. Id. at § 11-1403.
254. Id. at § 11-1404.
255. Id. at § 11-1405.
256. Id. at § 11-1406.
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and specifically defines the kinds of land use which will be
permitted in each area.25 7 The scenic rivers system is admin-
istered by the Department of Conservation in cooperation with
the Game and Fish commission. The Department establishes,
within the basic limits defined by the legislature, boundaries for
all shoreland areas to be included within the system.258 Unless
the appropriate local government zones these areas in a manner
satisfactory to the Department, the Commissioner of Conserva-
tion is permitted to acquire title in fee or preferably, "scenic
easements" over all land within scenic river areas.2 " Regard-
less of local ordinances, however, the Department is allowed
to "make and enforce" whatever additional regulations it deems
necessary to effectively carry out the purpose of the statute.
20 0
The scenic river acts in Michigan and Iowa are somewhat
less centralized, that is, the legislature has dictated policy less
inflexibly and there is more emphasis on local participation in
the regulatory process. In Michigan, the Natural Resources
Commission has authority to designate natural river areas, clas-
sify these areas according to characteristics and predominant
land use and prepare guidelines and a long range comprehen-
sive plan for the management of natural river areas.20 1 When
this is completed, the Commission may designate lands in unin-
corporated areas which require land use regulation. Local gov-
ernments are given one year to enact suitable controls for these
areas or, if they fail to do so, the Commission may promulgate
zoning rules consistent with statutory guidelines.20 2  Regard-
less of who enacts these zoning ordinances, however, primary
enforcement responsibility is apparently retained by the Com-
mission.20 3 In addition, where necessary to effectuate statutory
objectives, the Commission may acquire title, easements or other
interests in these areas, provided it receives the owner's con-
sent.
26 4
As in Michigan, the Iowa Conservation Commission may
designate natural river areas and classify those areas according
to use.265 However, the Commission is given no authority to
257. Id. at §§ 11-1403, 11-1411.
258. Id. at § 11-1408.
259. Id. at § 11-1409.
260. Id. at § 11-1406.
261. MicH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 281.763, .764, .768 (Supp. 1971).
262. Id. at § 281.768.
263. Id. at § 281.773.
264. Id. at § 281.765.
265. IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 108A.2, .3 (Supp. 1971).
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acquire interests in these lands (either by eminent domain or
with the owner's consent) and can not exercise direct regulatory
powers. The Commission is empowered simply to prepare a
comprehensive management plan for natural river areas, recom-
mend guidelines and standards for local zoning ordinances and
furnish assistance in the enforcement of any ordinances which
"adequately" protect "values of the river."20 6 The Commission's
role, then, is largely advisory, with little retained power either
to ensure local enactment of suitable ordinances or to regulate
natural river areas directly in the event such ordinances prove
inadequate.
These schemes of scenic river regulation have both advan-
tages and dangers. The more centralized approaches taken by
Michigan and Tennessee may result in greater expense to the
state. However, this expense still might be relatively small,
depending on the number, size and location of scenic river areas
within the state and the probability that the natural character-
istics of some areas would sufficiently discourage development
even without the enactment of regulations.207 If the anticipated
expense to the state were small, those drafting scenic river
statutes might look more closely at certain other considerations.
Stronger state control makes the protection of scenic rivers less
vulnerable to the pressures of local economic interest groups.
Conversely, the need for a local voice in the drafting of regula-
tions may seem less essential where, as in scenic river regula-
tion, the legislative intention is primarily to prohibit land devel-
opment rather than to regulate its growth. Many state and
local governments also may feel that the costs of regulations
designed to yield state-wide benefits should not be borne en-
tirely by the few local governments which happen to have state
designated scenic river areas within their boundaries.
One problem possibly common to all the scenic river stat-
utes is the danger that regulations promulgated under the acts
might be found unconstitutional. At some point, regulation of
land use may become so restrictive as to constitute a "taking,"
for which the United States Constitution requires the payment
266. Id. at §§ 108A.5, 108A.6.
267. Of the five Class-I designated rivers in Tennessee, four are
"gorge" rivers and one is a "swamp" river. The natural characteristics
of these rivers should adequately deter development of these river
areas without the need for regulations. Thus, administration of Class-I
rivers involves very little expense. Telephone interview with Mr. Max
Young, Dept. of Conservation, Division of Planning, Oct. 1970.
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of "just compensation" to the land owner .2 68 To meet the con-
tingency that certain regulations might be held to constitute a
"taking," it seems desirable that the basic scenic river enabling
statutes include some provision for responsive state action. Ex-
amples of this, noted earlier in the section on coastal wetlands, 20 9
might include the grant of eminent domain power to the state
board, or a provision that regulations held to constitute a "tak-
ing" be considered automatically void, or some variant of these.
Nevertheless, of the three statutes under consideration, only
Tennessee grants eminent domain power to the state board,270
and no state makes express reference to the possible constitu-
tional problem involved.
b. Michigan's Shorelands Protection and Management Act 27 1
The only other attempt to preserve shoreland areas by
direct state control has been Michigan's attempt in 1970 to reg-
ulate "high risk" and "environmental" areas along a bordering
Great Lake or connecting waterway. For purposes of the Stat-
ute, "high risk" areas are defined as those areas subject to ero-
sion and "environmental" areas are those areas necessary for
the preservation and maintenance of fish and wildlife.272 The
statute requires the Department of Natural Resources to desig-
nate environmental areas and recommend appropriate use regu-
lations for such areas to the local governments. 273 Similarly,
the Water Resources Commission identifies high risk areas and
proposes regulations for those areas which the department de-
termines require such measures.2 74  The local governments are
then allowed three years within which to zone high risk and
environmental areas, subject to approval by the Water Resources
Commission.2 7 5 In all cases, however, the Commission retains
general regulatory authority and may promulgate any rules ne-
cessary to implement purposes of the act.2 7 0
268. See Kusler, Water Quality Protection for Inland Lakes in Wis-
consin: A Comprehensive Approach to Water Pollution, 1970 Wis. L.
REv. 35 (1970); See also, Note, Minnesota's Flood Plain Management
Act-State Guidance of Land Use Controls, 55 MINN. L. Rsv. 1163, 1177
n.77 (1971).
269. See text accompanying notes 148-51 supra.
270. TENN. CODE ANN. § 11-1410 (Supp. 1970).
271. MIcH. Comp. LAws ANN. §§ 281.631 to .645 (Supp. 1971).
272. Id. at § 281.632.
273. Id. at § 281.634, .636.
274. Id. at §§ 281.633, .635.
275. Id. at §§ 281.637 to .640.
276. Id. at § 281.641.
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The Michigan statute combines strong state authority with
an opportunity for local participation at the option of the local
government. Adequate protection of high risk and environ-
mental areas may entail severe restrictions on land development.
As in scenic river areas, strong state authority seems better
designed to protect the state's interests and preclude local capit-
ulation to concentrated economic interests. In addition, it al-
lows the state to regulate critical areas quickly, thereby lessen-
ing the danger that substantial unwanted development will
occur in the interim between passage of the statute and final
enactment of use regulations.27 7  The additional provisions giv-
ing local governments the option to enact their own regulations
may lessen expense to the state while at the same time making
the statute more palatable to the local units whose cooperation
will be necessary to the effective enforcement of the regulatory
scheme.
B. FLOOD PLAINS AND FLOOD WAYS
Massive expenditures in recent years for flood control and
prevention have not been adequate to reduce annual losses from
flood damage to acceptable levels.2 7 8 Flood losses are still esti-
mated to exceed $1 billion per year.2 7 0  The conviction has
grown that what is needed to solve the problem is some program
of land use management, that is, some "attempt to keep men
away from floods rather than ... keeping floods away from
men. s2 8 0 This conviction was given impetus in 1968 when
Congress passed the National Flood Insurance Act.28 ' This act
provides flood insurance for property owners in flood-prone -28 2
areas, but makes the plan available only in those states or
areas which have shown a "positive interest" in flood plain man-
agement. This must be accomplished through enactment of
land use control measures consistent with federal guidelines.2831
277. Cf. note 223 supra.
278. See Note, supra note 268.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 1167.
281. Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§
4001-4127 (Supp. V, 1971) [hereinafter cited as NFIA].
282. The maximum area of the flood plain likely to be flooded once
every 100 years. 24 C.F.R. § 1909.1 (1971). Most state statutes have
conformed to this requirement, although Montana and Maryland have
not, choosing to define flood prone areas as those flooded once every
50 years. IND. ANN. CODE art. 96A § 2(e) (Supp. 1971); MONT. REV.
CODE AN. § 89-3504(2) (Supp. 1971).
283. NFIA § 4012(c).
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While varied procedures have been adopted to regulate land
use in flood-prone areas, most recent statutes have opted to
place some responsibility at the state level. These statutes fall
roughly into two groups. Six states284 have chosen to intervene
in flood plain regulation only when the proposed development
would tend to increase flood damage in other areas. This would
occur primarily whenever (1) the proposed development was
situated on land which was necessary to carry and discharge
flood waters, and (2) the development substantially interfered
with the land's ability to accomplish this objective. Predictably,
the result would be heightened flood waters in other areas and
increased flood damage.28 5  A second group of states280 has
chosen to encourage comprehensive regulation of all flood plain
areas. Although regulation of areas more remote from the flood
channel presumably would be limited, 28 7 it is justified here as
a means to reduce overall flood losses by prohibiting develop-
ments which would be likely to suffer unreasonably high dam-
age in the event of flooding.288 It is only these latter statutes
which fully comply with the National Flood Insurance Act.2 0
1. Limited Regulation of Flood Plains
State-level guidance of flood plain regulation is provided
in six states290 primarily for the purpose of ensuring unob-
structed discharge of flood waters and preventing unreasonable
flood hazards. Four states2 1' expressly limit the scope of their
regulation to flood ways, i.e., the area of the flood plain which
carries flood waters, as opposed to areas where there is ponding
but little actual flowage. The remaining states29 2 permit regu-
lation of the entire flood plain, but make clear that the purpose
of this regulation is to avoid increased public hazards and to
prohibit development which would unreasonably obstruct flood
water discharge.
284. Connecticut, Indiana, Michigan, Montana, Nebraska, North Car-
olina. See Part V(B) (1) infra.
285. Another result of interference with flood water discharge would
be increased flood hazards to life and property in other areas.
286. Arkansas, Iowa, Maryland, Michigan, Wisconsin. See Part V
(B) (2) infra.
287. See Beuchert, Zoning on the Flood Plain, 49 A.B.A.J. 258
(1963).
288. See generally Note, supra note 268, at 1164-67.
289. See 24 C.F.R. § 1910.6(c) (2).
290. Connecticut, Indiana, Michigan, Montana, Nebraska, North
Carolina.




The statutes of Indiana, Montana, Nebraska and North
Carolina apply only to flood ways. In Indiana, - 3 use of flood
way land which unduly restricts the capacity of the flood way
or which creates an unreasonable hazard to life or property is
prohibited, except with specific authorization by the Natural
Resources Comnmission. 204 In Nebraska,9 15 the Soil and Water
Conservation Commission defines each flood way area, and the
appropriate local government is then given one year to enact
suitable regulations consistent with minimum standards fur-
nished by the Commission. 296 No subsequent development may
be carried out in the flood way without a local permit.297  Fail-
ing suitable local action, however, location of any "artificial ob-
struction" within the flood way is absolutely prohibited, except
in accordance with direct commission authorization and a com-
mission permit.298  The Montana statute 99 is essentially identi-
cal to Nebraska's, although the former could be interpreted 3 9
(but has not been)30 1 to require a state permit in all cases,
regardless of local action. In North Carolina,30 2 local govern-
ments are responsible for prohibiting unwanted obstructions in
the flood way,30 3 but the State Board of Water and Air Re-
sources may furnish suggested standards, technical data and
other assistance, and may issue regulations interpreting the
basic requirements of the act.30 4
In Connecticut and Michigan, a state commission is permit-
ted to regulate the entire flood plain, but the purposes for
which such regulation may be enacted are limited. In Connecti-
cut,30 5 the Water Resources Commission establishes channel en-
croachment lines within which no development is permitted
293. IND. ANN. STAT. § 27-1101 et seq. (1970).
294. Id. at § 27-1117. Section 27-1115 contains language which sug-
gests that the Commission may also engage directly in "flood plain
regulation." However, the Commission considers this language am-
biguous and presently engages in no direct regulation of the flood plain.
Telephone interview with Mr. Bob Jackson, Chief of Division of Water,
Indiana Department of Natural Resources, Nov., 1971.
295. NEE. REv. STAT. § 2-1506.01 etseq. (1970).
296. Id. at § 2-1506.03.
297. Id. at § 2-1506.05.
298. Id. at §§ 2-1506.13(3), .06.
299. MoNT. REv. COD- ANN. § 89-3501 et seq. (Supp. 1971).
300. Compare id. at § 89-3506 with id. at § 89-3514.
301. Telephone interview with Mr. Rick Bondy, Montana Water Re-
sources Board, Nov. 1971.
302. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.51 et seq. (Supp. 1971).
303. Id. at § 143-215.57.
304. Id. at § 143-215.56 (b).
305. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 25-4a et seq. (Supp. 1971).
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without Commission approval.30 6 Although the encroachment
lines are intended generally to define the area likely to be
inundated by flood, these lines may be varied so as to minimize
the area in which planned development would not affect dis-
charge of flood waters.30 7 Within these boundaries, the Com-
mission may issue or deny permits based upon the effect of the
proposed encroachment upon the flood-carrying capacity of the
waterway and the likelihood of increased hazards to life and
property.3 0 8 In Michigan,3 0 9 all non-agricultural uses of land in
the flood plain which "harmfully interfere with the discharge
or stage characteristics of a stream" are prohibited except where
authorized by the Water Resources Commission or Department
of Conservation. Again, the state's authority to regulate areas
of the flood plain outside of flood way boundaries is extremely
limited.3 1 0
The decisions of these states not to enact a comprehensive
flood plain management program may be based upon a number
of factors. The needed controls over land use in the outlying
flood plain are often of a very limited nature. Many areas of
the flood plain are rarely flooded and can be put to highly
economical use. It would make little sense to prohibit such use
where the economic benefits from normal years far outweighed
the losses incurred in the flood year.311 Thus, controls limited
primarily to building and sanitary codes, flood warning systems
and the prohibition of certain critical uses such as hospital or
jails may often be all that is needed.312 Many state legislators
may conclude that local governments are adequate to enact these
limited measures.
306. Id. at § 25-4a.
307. Id. at § 25-4b.
308. Id. at § 25-4a.
309. MxcH. Comp. LAWs ANN. § 323.5b (Supp. 1971).
310. At least one commentator has suggested that the language
quoted above should be interpreted as absolutely limiting the Commis-
sion's authority to flood ways. See Bartke, Dredging, Filling and Flood
Plain Regulation in Michigan, 17 WAYNE L. REV. 861, 904 (1971). How-
ever, regulations issued by the Commission leave open the narrow
possibility of some regulation of the outer flood plain. These regula-
tions state: "An encroachment in the flood plain landward of floodway
limits which does not cause harmful interference may be permitted."
MICH. A]D. CODE R. 323.205 (3) (Supp. No. 62, 1970) (emphasis added).
311. See Beuchert, supra note 287.
312. Id. See also MINN. STAT. § 104.05(c) (Supp. 1971), describ-
ing "alternate or supplemental flood plain management measures such
as flood proofing, subdivision regulations, building codes, sanitary reg-
ulations, and flood warning systems."
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A second factor which may have persuaded these states not
to enact a comprehensive flood plain program is the pragmatic
fear that such a program could not be passed, at least in an
effective form. Plans for state-guided regulation of the entire
flood plain are almost certain to encounter stiff political oppo-
sition from local governments which see such regulation as an
encroachment on local power and autonomy.31 3 However, such
opposition might be significantly reduced if state intervention
was limited solely to flood ways. For example, despite de-
termined local opposition, 14 Montana was able in 1971 to enact
a strong and effective program of mandatory, state-guided regu-
lation of flood ways. Similar legislation introduced two years
earlier in Minnesota, but made applicable to the entire flood
plain of each river, had to be modified significantly before it
could be passed.3 15 It is important to note that rather than
simply decreasing the state's powers over the outlying flood
plains, the final version emasculated state powers over all areas,
including flood ways.3 10
To those who see flood way regulation as the crucial ele-
ment in any program of flood plain management, the danger of
compromise such as that which occurred in Minnesota is omi-
nous indeed. This is because property damage is likely to be
most severe in flood way areas. Structures in the flood way
which become dislodged may cause serious hazards to property
downstream, and obstructions which restrict flood water dis-
charge will raise flood levels and cause increased flood damage
in other areas. Thus, if nothing else, strong flood way regula-
tion is essential.31 7
One consideration which favors excluding the outlying flood
plain areas from state-level regulation is the fact that such a
program fails fully to comply with the National Flood Insurance
Act.318 Regulations promulgated under the Act require that
313. See text accompanying notes 4-7 supra.
314. Telephone interview with Mr. Rick Bondy, Montana Water Re-
sources Board, Nov., 1971.
315. See text accompanying note 329 infra; see also Note, Minne-
sota's Flood Plain Management Act-State Guidance of Land Use Con-
trols, 55 Mmnx. L. REv. 1163, 1169-85 (1971).
316. Id.
317. In addition, a state presumably could be quite flexible in its
delineation of flood ways, being sure to include those areas which,
although not typified by substantial water flowage during flooding,
would be apt to incur substantial flood damage if not properly regu-
lated.
318. See text accompanying notes 281-83 supra.
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land use restrictions to be acceptable must apply "at a mini-
mum" 19 to "the maximum area of the flood plain which is
likely to be flooded once every 100 years.8320 Accordingly, if
local governments have failed to enact acceptable control mea-
sures in the flood plain area beyond the flood way,,'21 property
owners in that area will not qualify for the insurance. Even
more dangerous is the possibility that because the outlying flood
plain was not adequately regulated, those located within the
flood way would also not be eligible for federal insurance, even
though the flood way itself was adequately regulated. 22
A second problem with some of the statutes is the danger
that the scope of the regulatory powers conferred could be in-
terpreted too narrowly. For example, controls designed solely
for the purpose of reducing damage to structures located in
the flood way may not be justified by the language of some
statutes if such controls do not have the additional goal of re-
ducing obstructions to flood water discharge or preventing in-
creased flood hazards in other areas. Though such a possibility
is slight, it is not inconceivable. In Nebraska, for example,
the purpose of the statute is "to minimize the extent of floods
and reduce the height and violence thereof insofar as such are
caused by any natural or artificial obstruction restricting the
capacity of the flood ways of the waters of the state. '8 , 2,8 Thus
a building code which had no impact on a structure's tendency
to restrict flood water discharge but which would substantially
reduce damage to the property in the event of flooding might
not come within the statutory language. Enactment of such
regulation presumably would be left to the unguided discre-
tion of the local government under its general zoning and regu-
latory authority.3 24
319. 24 C.F.R. § 1910.6 (1971).
320. Id. at § 1909.1.
321. See id. at § 1910.6(c) (2).
322. 42 U.S.C. § 4022 (Supp. 1971) provides that flood insurance
will be unavailable after December 31, 1971, unless "an appropriate
public body shall have adopted adequate land use and control meas-
ures .... ." Regulations issued under the statute require that such
measures must be applicable "at a minimum" to the area of the flood
plain likely to be flooded once every 100 years. 24 C.F.R. § 1910.6
(1971).
323. NEB. REV. STAT. § 2-1506.01 (1970).
324. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 23-172 (1970). But cf. Bartke, supra
note 305, at 907, suggesting that in some cases local action may have
been preempted by enactment of the state statute such that local gov-




2. Comprehensive Flood Plain Regulation
In addition to the need for unobstructed flood water dis-
charge, there are other purposes toward which flood plain man-
agement can be directed which would not fully be served with-
out some regulation of the outlying flood plain. At least three
reasons justifying comprehensive flood plain regulation have
been suggested: (1) to the extent it is unwise to develop on a
flood plain because of possible damage from flood waters, the
state must protect from themselves persons who do try to de-
velop there; (2) people often will not know a flood danger
exists, and so are easily victimized; (3) there is injury to tax-
payers by requiring unnecessary expenditures for public works
and disaster relief.325 In order effectively to attack these flood-
ing problems, at least five states-Arkansas, Iowa, Maryland,
Minnesota and Wisconsin-recently have enacted comprehensive
programs designed to regulate the entire flood plain.
In Minnesota,326 the Commissioner of Natural Resources
provides technical assistance to local governments and develops
criteria and other regulations to guide local enactment of flood
plain ordinances. 27 Direct responsibility for enacting such reg-
ulations remains at the local level, although flood plain man-
agement ordinances must be approved by the Commissioner
before taking effect.328 No sanction is imposed for a local gov-
ernment's failure to enact satisfactory regulations and there is
no deadline for local compliance with statutory requirements.320
In Arkansas3 30 and Wisconsins 3 local governments are
given primary responsibility for regulating flood plain use, but
an appropriate state agency under certain circumstances may
determine that such regulation is inadequate and adopt suitable
regulations for the local government. 33 2 In Wisconsin, the local
325. See Beuchert, supra note 282.
326. MbNw. STAT. § 104.01 et seq. (Supp. 1971).
327. Id. at §§ 104.03, .05.
328. Id. at § 104.04.
329. Local governments are required, however, to submit a letter of
"intent to comply" no later than June 30, 1970. Id. at § 104.04(2).
330. Apm STAT. ANN. § 21-1901 et seq. (Supp. 1969).
331. -Wis. STAT. ANN. § 87.30 (Supp. 1971).
332. In Arkansas, the state is permitted to adopt its own regula-
tions only if local regulations are not "reasonable and effective" and
insurance under the National Flood Insurance Act is cut off as a result.
ARm STAT. ANN. § 21-1903 (Supp. 1969). In Wisconsin, the state may
zone if the local government fails to zone effectively prior to a stated
future date. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 87.30 (Supp. 1971).
1972]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
government is given only the authority to zone3 3 and is re-
quired to complete its regulation by a stated future date. '
Arkansas permits considerably broader regulation, but the state
is empowered to supplant ineffective local regulations only in
the event that flood insurance under the National Flood In-
surance Act has been denied 3: 5  In neither state is the state
agency given express authority either to provide technical as-
sistance to local governments or to issue criteria and guidelines
for the enactment of local ordinances.
Iowa336 and Maryland 33 7 have placed considerably more
power at the state level than have the other states. A desig-
nated state department-the Iowa Natural Resources Council or
the Maryland Department of Natural Resources-has authority
to issue and enforce regulations governing the use of flood
plains, 338 and no structure may be built within a flood plain
area without departmental approval.3 39 In Iowa, local govern-
ments, with assistance of the Natural Resources Council, may
enact their own programs for flood plain regulation which, if
approved by the council, will eliminate the need for individual
approval of development applications by the Council.8 4 0 Mary-
land also provides for state assistance to local governments in
the drafting of flood plain regulations, but the effect of such
local enactment is not specified. 3 "
These statutes, as well as the flood way statutes considered
earlier, are too diverse to permit much comparison. However,
a few general conclusions are possible. In addition to deciding
what area of the flood plain should be governed by the new
333. However, regulations issued under the statute permit the local
governments to promulgate other types of regulations as well. See
WIs. ADm. CODE NR 116.05(c) (1971).
334. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 87.30 (Supp. 1971).
335. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-1902, 21-1903 (Supp. 1969).
336. IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 455A.33, 455A.35 (1971).
337. MD. ANN. CODE art. 96A, §§ 1-22 (1964), § 51 (Supp. 1971).
338. IowA CODE ANN. § 455A.35 (1971); MD. ANN. CODE art. 96A,
§ 5 (1964).
339. Iowa CODE ANN. § 455A.33 (1971); MD. ANN. CODE art. 96A,
§§ 2, 11 (1964) (Note-under Section 2, "waters of the state" are de-
fined to include flood plains).
340. IowA CODE ANN. § 455A.35 (1971). Few local governments have
as yet enacted flood plain ordinances which meet state criteria. Appar-
ently most local governments have concluded that it is simpler and more
expedient to allow the state to take responsibility for flood plain man-
agement. Interview with Mr. James Cooper, Iowa Natural Resources
Council, April 3, 1972.
341. MD. ANN. CODE art. 96A, § 51 (Supp. 1971).
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regulations, states drafting flood plain regulations will have to
be concerned with the following issues:
What forms of regulations should be utilized? Of the 11
states considered, seven 342 require a state permit as a precondi-
tion to any development in the flood hazard area. Six of these
states combine with the permit requirement some procedure for
issuance of regulations either by the state board 343 or department
or by the appropriate local government.3 4 4  These regulations
usually will define encroachment limits345 for the flood plain and
the flood way and may announce criteria for issuance of the nec-
essary development permits.346 Those states347 which do not re-
quire permits rely on broad regulation by local governments. 348
Usually this would include the enactment of zoning ordinances,
subdivision controls, building codes, sanitary regulations and
flood warning systems.3 4 9
Strict regulation of the flood plain has been held in at least
one case to constitute a "taking" of land without just compensa-
tion. 350 In Dooley v. Town Plan & Zoning Commission,35' a town
enacted a flood plain zoning district restricting the use of land
within the district to parks and recreational facilities, govern-
mental wildlife sanctuaries, farming and accessory motor ve-
hicle parking. The court held the change in districting uncon-
stitutional on the ground that it rendered impossible any practi-
cal use of the plaintiff's land. 352  Though Dooley has been
distinguished in subsequent cases,353 it suggests that at some
point, regulation will become so restrictive as to be practically
confiscatory, amounting to an unconstitutional taking.
342. Connecticut, Indiana, Iowa, Maryland, Michigan, Montana and
Nebraska.
343. Connecticut, Iowa, Maryland, Michigan, Montana and Nebraska.
344. Montana and Nebraska.
345. I.e., boundary limits.
346. Interview with Mr. James Cooper, Iowa Natural Resources
Council, April 3, 1972.
347. Arkansas, Minnesota, North Carolina and Wisconsin.
348. In Arkansas and Wisconsin the state may be permitted to regu-
late if local controls are ineffective. See note 54 supra.
349. This is true in Wisconsin, even though the statute speaks only
of "zoning." See Wis. ADM. CoDE NR 116.05 (1971).
350. See note 268 supra.
351. 151 Conn. 304, 197 A.2d 770 (1964).
352. 1I at 311-12, 197 A.2d at 773.
353. Samp Mortar Lake Co. v. Town Plan and Zoning Comnm'n,
155 Conn. 310, 231 A.2d 649 (1967) (plaintiff's land rezoned residen-
tial); Second Norwalk Corp. v. Planning and Zoning Comm'n, 28 Conn.
Supp. 426, 265 A.2d 332 (1969) (refusal by defendant to rezone plain-
tiffs land from business and residence to "design development").
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What direct or residual regulatory authority should be re-
tained by the states? In three states35 4 the authority to regulate
flood plain use rests exclusively with a state department or com-
mission. The remaining eight states contemplate some form of
cooperate action by state and local authorities. However, the
statutes vary considerably in defining the scope of regulatory au-
thority to be retained at the state level. In two states3 r the ap-
propriate state department is immediately responsible for ini-
tiating flood plain control measures. Local governments also
are encouraged to regulate but generally have not done so.3 50
Four statutes357 permit the state to regulate only where a local
government fails to enact suitable regulations, usually within a
prescribed time period. Two states, Minnesota and North Caro-
lina, place no regulatory power at the state level. The state
agency has power only to define criteria or, in Minnesota, to dis-
approve inadequate local regulation.
If regulation of flood plains or flood ways is to be a co-
operative effort between state and local governments, a number
of other issues must be faced. For example, what provision
should be made to ensure that local regulation adequately com-
plies with statutory standards and objectives? What kind of
guidance and technical assistance should be furnished by the
state to aid local action? Additional issues 358 may arise as well
and in this regard the reader may wish to refer to the earlier
discussion on shoreland statutes in Section A of this Part.
Furnishing assistance to local governments. Only half of the
eight states which permit cooperative action between state and
local governments explicitly direct the state agency to issue min-
imum or suggested guidelines for local action.3 5 9  Only six
states3 60 provide for direct technical assistance and data dissemi-
354. Connecticut, Indiana and Michigan.
355. Iowa and Maryland.
356. Interview with Mr. James Cooper, Iowa Natural Resources
Council, April 3, 1972.
357. Arkansas, Montana, Nebraska, Wisconsin. There is no pro-
scribed time period in Arkansas. See note 335 supra.
358. I.e., (1) provision for continuing state review of local action;
(2) what time table should local governments be required to meet?
By and large, floodplain statutes are relatively unsophisticated, at least
by comparison to some of the shoreland statutes considered earlier.
Additional issues not mentioned here may be suggested by reference
to the shorelands discussion considered earlier.
359. Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska and North Carolina make such
provision. Arkansas, Iowa, Maryland and Wisconsin do not.




nation. Experience in Minnesota suggests that direct assistance
and dissemination of information by the state is of important
benefit to local governments seeking to draft adequate flood
plain regulations.30 1 Local personnel often begin with little
knowledge of flood plain problems and may lack the training or
technical data which they need to identify the flood plain and
flood way or to competently regulate land use within it. The
generation and distribution of sample ordinances, as well as pro-
vision for direct assistance through data collection programs,
workshops, engineering reports or meetings with local officials
eases the task of local governments and may often be essential
to effective local regulation.3 2
Ensuring that local regulation is adequate. Informal guid-
ance by the state through model ordinances and technical as-
sistance provides an easy shortcut for drafters of local legislation
and seems likely therefore to have some impact in shaping local
ordinances. Most states, however, have felt a need for more
definite assurance that statutory requirements will be complied
with. Six states363 require state approval of local regulations
before they take effect. By implication, the state department
presumably has power to announce the minimum criteria upon
which this grant of approval will depend 3 0 4 Such power to adopt
minimum standards is nevertheless granted expressly in Minne-
sota, Montana and Nebraska. This makes it more likely that
minimum standards will in fact be issued to guide and assist local
legislators. In Arkansas, where direct state approval of local reg-
ulation is not required, the statute effectively incorporates by
reference the minimum standards of the National Flood Insur-
ance Act, permitting the state commission to supplant ineffective
local regulations which cause denial of federal flood insurance.
VI. REGIONAL LAND USE CONTROL AGENCIES
Land use control is one of the governmental functions being
assumed by the increasing number of metropolitan govern-
361. Interview with Mr. James Wright, Minnesota Department of
Natural Resources, Division of Water, Soils and Minerals, Nov., 1971.
362. Id.
363. Iowa, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska and Wisconsin provide
so expressly. Maryland seems to imply that state approval will be
required. See MA. AwN. CoDn art. 96A, § 51 (Supp. 1971).
364. For example, though not expressly directed to do so, the Wis-
consin Department of Natural Resources recently has issued compre-
hensive regulations to govern local regulation of flood plains. See
Wis. Am. CODE NR 116.01 et seq. (1971).
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ments. It is also the sole or primary function of a number of
regional bodies with responsibility for development and conser-
vation. This section will focus on the latter because metropoli-
tan government is beyond the scope of this note, but the reader
is alerted that metropolitan government is one of the ways in
which land use control is being shifted away from traditional
county and municipal units.
3 15
At least three viable models for regional agencies which
are to be concerned primarily with land use control have been
produced by recent legislation: the Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency, 366 the San Francisco Bay Commission3 67 and the Hack-
ensack Meadowland Development Commission.31, The Tahoe
basin, a 500 square mile area in eastern California and western
Nevada, was brought under a degree of regional control in
1969.369 The 10 member governing body of the Agency would
appear from the face of the statute to be dominated by repre-
sentatives of local interests. That is, three are appointed by
the constituent California counties and municipalities, three by
the constituent Nevada counties, one by the governor of Cal-
ifornia, one by the governor of Nevada, one by the administrator
of the California Resources Agency, and one by the director of
the Nevada Department of Conservation and Natural Re-
sources.3 70 In fact the county representatives have often been
residents of portions of the counties which are not part of the
Tahoe basin and regional or state-wide concerns have been
given paramount consideration.3 71 This created initial prob-
lems for the agency in securing the cooperation of the local
residents, who favored rapid development of the area to relieve
property taxes and viewed the agency's role as dictatorial. But
reportedly the adoption of a plan permitting a maximum popu-
lation of 200,000 has now been accepted by all.3 72
365. For an excellent survey of the forms metropolitan government
has taken see Lineberry, Reforming Metropolitan Governance: Re-
quiem or Reality, 58 GA. L.J. 675 (1970).
366. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 66800 et seq. (Supp. 1971) and NEV. REV
STAT. § 277.190 et seq. (1969).
367. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 66600 et seq. (1966 and Supp. 1971).
368. N.J. STAT. A . § 13:17-1 et seq. (Supp. 1971).
369. A brief discussion of the political forces which shaped the
Tahoe Regional Planning Compact is contained in Note, Regional Gov-
ernment for Lake Tahoe, 22 HASTINGS L.J. 705 (1971). Early problems of
funding and local acceptance are reported F. BOSSELMAN & G. CALLIES,
THE QUIET REVOLUTION IN LAND UsE CONTROL 291 (1971).
370. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 66801, art. III(a) (Supp. 1971).
371. Interview with Mr. Greg George, Assistant Planner, Tahoe Re-




The Tahoe agency is attempting to achieve its goal of pre-
serving the natural beauty and economic productivity of the
region 373 by enacting ordinances and regulations3 7 ' which will
implement the land use, transportation, conservation, recreation
and public service plans it has adopted.375 The ordinances and
regulations constitute "a minimum standard applicable through-
out the basin, and any political subdivision may adopt and en-
force an equal or higher standard applicable to the same subject
of regulation in its territory."37  Minimum standards may be
anticipated to be inadequate where there is a problem as to
the location of undesirable uses such as low cost, high density
housing in an urban area. However, in Tahoe the goal of the
local government is maximum development of a recreation area
and no development permitted by the agency's minimum stand-
ard is likely to be prohibited by more stringent local stand-
ard. 377
Enforcement of the plans, ordinances and regulations of the
Tahoe agency is primarily the responsibility of the constituent
states, "counties and cities although the agency has an ambiguous
power to "bring action in a court of competent jurisdiction to
ensure compliance" if the constituents do not.3 78 This enforce-
ment power has not yet been tested in the courts but actions
are likely to be sought soon.3 79 It was necessary for the agency
to seek judicial action380 to force the constituent California
counties to pay the $150,000 portion of the agency's annual
budget allocated to them.381 For amounts in excess of $150,000
the agency is dependent on appropriations by the legislatures
of California and Nevada and on federal grants.38 2
The area under the jurisdiction of the San Francisco Bay
Conservation and Development Commission is the Bay, its salt-
ponds and wetlands, a 100 foot wide band of shoreland and
373. CAi. GOV'T CODE § 66801, art. I(a) (Supp. 1971).
374. The power to enact all necessary ordinances, rules, regulations
and policies to effectuate the adopted regional plans is granted by CAL.
GOV'T CODE § 66801, art. VI(a) (Supp. 1971).
375. CAT_ GOV'T CODE § 66801, art. V(b) (Supp. 1971).
376. Id. at § 66801, art. VI (a).
377. Interview with Mr. Greg George, Assistant Planner, Tahoe Re-
gional Planning Agency, April 12, 1972.
378. CAL. GOVT CODE § 66801, art. VI(e).
379. Interview, supra note 377.
380. People ex rel. Younger v. County of El Dorado, 96 Cal. Rptr.
553 (1971), 5 Cal. 2d 480, 487 P.2d 1193 (1971).




certain creeks.3 3 As in the case of Tahoe it would appear from
the face of the statute establishing the Commission that it is
dominated by representatives of local government: nine repre-
sent constituent counties, four constituent cities, four state agen-
cies, one a regional agency, and seven (selected by the governor
and legislature from residents of the region) represent the pub-
lic.38 4 The danger of becoming a forum for competing local
interests apparently has been avoided, since most of the repre-
sentatives of local governments have taken a regional outlook
and the public, state and regional representatives are only one
vote short of a majority.38 5 The staff of the Commission con-
siders the large number of state and public representatives as
an important factor in the Commission's success when com-
pared with the inaction of the Association of Bay Area Govern-
ments, which has only representatives of local governments. 80
On the other hand relations with local governments have not
been harmonious. A dispute with the city of Oakland over
construction of a municipal parking lot and storage yard was
kept out of court only by a last minute compromise.3817 Efforts
to compromise with the city of San Francisco on the construc-
tion of a commercial plaza on piers leased by the San Francisco
Port Authority to private developers have not succeeded and
suit has been brought by the city.3 88
The Bay Commission seeks to implement its plan for con-
trolling development by acquiring land for public uses and by
prohibiting filling of the Bay or changing the use of water,
land or structures within its jurisdiction without a permit. 8 9
The permit requirement is of the double-veto type common in
the wetlands statutes, i.e., it is superimposed on and does not
replace permit requirements of existing political subdivisions. 9 0
Control also is shared with the United States Army Corps of
383. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 66610 (Supp. 1971).
384. Id. at § 66620.
385. Interview with Allan Pendleton, Staff Attorney, San Francisco
Bay Conservation and Development Commission, April 13, 1972.
386. Id. The Association of Bay Area Governments was formed at
the instigation of local governments under the Joint Powers Act, CAL.
GOV'T CODE § 6500 et seq. (1966 and Supp. 1972). The Association
has no formal statutory powers but acts the clearing for applications
for applications for federal acts required by the Demonstration Cities
Act. See notes 362-65 supra, and accompanying text.
387. F. BOSSELMAN & D. CALLIES, supra note 369, at 113-14.
388. Id. at 115-19.
389. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 66630.1 & 66632 (Supp. 1971).
390. Id. at § 66632(b).
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Engineers which must grant permits for any encroachment upon
any navigable waters,391 and with various state agencies such
as the Regional Water Quality Control Board, which sets stand-
ards for waste discharged into the Bay.302  Flexibility in the
permit procedure is possible because the Commission is au-
thorized to grant permits subject to restrictions or specified
conditions.393 As in Tahoe the danger of local governments
taking a more restrictive stance than the Commission and ex-
cluding developments favored by the Commission has not ma-
terialized because the local governments favor maximum de-
velopment. In the one instance in which local residents did
wish to exclude a commission approved development, houseboats
for artists in Sausalito, the Commission persuaded the county
to also grant its approval. 39 4  Permit fees are expected this
year to begin contributing to the support of the Commission
which heretofore has been wholly dependent on appropriations
of the state legislature. 39 5
The Hackensack Meadowlands legislation is the most com-
prehensive of the recent regional planning statutes. It comes
closest to obliterating old political boundaries and vesting tradi-
tionally local governmental land use powers in the new re-
gional agency. The Meadowlands Development Commission is
also the most free of local domination of the three agencies
examined. One member is the commissioner of the state Depart-
ment of Community Affairs and the remaining six, four of
whom must be residents of the region, are appointed by the
governor.396 Participation by constituent local governments at
the decision making level is restricted to the Municipal Com-
mittee, a committee consisting of the mayors of the constituent
municipalities and empowered only to review codes, building
standards and plans submitted by the commission and to force
by its rejection of the recommendations their adoption by a
five-sevenths vote rather than a simple majority.39 7 The broad
powers of the Commission include the power to issue bonds, to
acquire and develop land, to adopt a master plan for develop-
ment and codes and standards for its effectuation, to levy special
391. Id. at § 66632.1.
392. Id. at § 66632(e).
393. Id. at § 66632(f).
394. Interview with Allan Pendleton, Staff Attorney, San Fran-
cisco Bay Conservation and Development Commission, April 13, 1972.
395. Id.; CAL. GOV'T CODE § 66632(a).
396. N.J. STT. ANN. § 13:17-5(b) (Supp. 1971).
397. Id. at § 13:17-7 & 8.
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assessments, to establish engineering standards and building
codes, to regulate plans for any subdivision within the district,
to undertake redevelopment projects, to consult with state and
federal agencies, to establish standards covering land use and
comprehensive zoning and to prohibit construction in the re-
gion without a permit.3 98  Constituent municipalities are pro-
hibited from enacting or enforcing any code which is inconsist-
ent with the code adopted by the Commission8 9 and from
expending any public funds within the region without the ap-
proval of the Commission. 40 0  Enforcement actions may be
brought by the Commission itself and violations of its permit
requirements may result in fines of $200 and imprisonment for
30 days.40 1
Relations between the Development Commission and the
Municipal Committee have been strained. The second stage of
the Commission's development plan, the portion which contains
the specifics of the zoning and building codes, is now being
considered by the municipal committee. 40 2 Already the constit-
uent municipalities have challenged the constitutionality of the
Commission in toto, but this challenge has been rejected by the
lower court.4 0 3  Disputes over the specific terms of the second
stage of the plan are expected. Generally the local govern-
ments favor continuation of the construction of warehouses and
light industry which contributes to the tax base but demands
few public services. The Commission has zoned the land for
residential development, including low income housing.'0 4 If
the Hackensack municipalities had the power of the local gov-
ernments in the Tahoe and San Francisco Bay regions to en-
force more stringent regulations than those of the regional com-
mission, the Commission's plan undoubtedly would fail.
The Hackensack commission supports its own activities
through federal and state grants-in-aid, fees for the use of its
facilities, special assessments and payments by municipalities for
services rendered by the Commission.40 .  It also acts as the
398. Id. at § 13:17-6.
399. Id. at § 13:17-11(b).
400. Id. at § 13:17-12(b).
401. Id. at § 13:17-19.
402. Interview with Garry Rosensweig, Staff Member, Hackensack
Meadowlands Development Commission, April 14, 1972.
403. Galiardo v. Hackensack Development Com'n., 112 N.J. Super.
89, 270 A.2d 418 (1970).
404. Interview, supra note 402.
405. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:17-77 (Supp. 1971).
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agent of an inter-municipal tax-sharing fund which seeks to
allocate the financial benefits and liabilities of development of
the meadowlands among the constituent municipalities.4 0
Though the original statutory formula for tax sharing was one
of the municipalities' criticisms of the Commission, the Commis-
sion is now turning the issue to its advantage by sponsoring
legislation to revise the formula.40 7
All three of the regional agencies concerned primarily with
land use appear to be succeeding and any one may be used as
a model by other states. There is a pattern present in the
legislation establishing the agencies, however, and it should be
considered by draftsmen. Under that pattern, more absolute
power over land use placed in the new regional agency results
in less participation in the decision making process guar-
anteed to existing governmental units. Existing local govern-
ments are denied representation in the decision making when
the authority of the regional agency over land use is not lim-
ited by the possibility of more stringent local standards. Per-
haps this is only to say that the local governments which have
not had sufficient political influence with the legislatures to
restrict the new agency to setting minimum standards have also
lacked the influence to demand a role in the decision making.
But perhaps also it reflects a collective judgment that com-
missions which are composed solely of representatives of local
governments or are dominated by them are likely to be merely
another forum for local interest competition. Weighing the
need for decisiveness against the need for cooperation between
the constituent governments and the regional agency, legislation
probably should combine a commission with a mixed member-
ship such as the San Francisco Bay conservation and develop-
ment commission with absolute permit requirements or zoning
and building code standards, free of the threat of more stringent
local regulation such as those of the Hackensack Meadowlands
Development Commission.
406. Id. at §§ 13:17-60 to -76.
407. Interview, supra note 402.
19721
